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This Article identifies and analyzes the obstacles that presently bar the
rise of renewables, evaluates the role of the current policy favorite-emission
pricing-and offers design recommendations for a comprehensive U.S.
renewables policy.
Successful climate change mitigation requires a timely shift to renewable
sources of energy, such as sunlight, wind, or tides, to decarbonize today's high-
carbon electricity sector. But market pull alone is not strong enough. This
Article discusses the most widely cited economic barriers and identifies and
evaluates additional obstacles related to the electricity sector's market
structure and regulatory framework.
Emission pricing is largely considered the most efficient policy to drive
the timely transition to a renewables-based electricity sector. This Article
argues that, for political, conceptual, and, most of all, regulatory reasons,
emission pricing will not fuel the rise of renewables at the speed necessary for
successful climate change mitigation.
Rather, a comprehensive renewables policy is required to address each
and every one of the existing barriers. Drawing on the policy experience of
other sectors and nations, I offer recommendations for the design of a
comprehensive U.S. renewables policy. Many of the proposed policy
recommendations aim at non-economic barriers, which can be overcome
through regulatory intervention. Once these barriers have been removed,
policy support for renewables can focus on the remaining economic barriers
and, hence, becomes far less costly. In light of the plethora of obstacles to a
timely transition to renewables, this Article calls for concerted policy action by
scientists, engineers, economists, lawyers, marketers, and educators to fuel the
renewables revolution.
Copyright @ 2011 Regents of the University of California.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change has turned the transition to renewable energy sources into
one of the world's key challenges of the twenty-first century.' If we are to limit
global warming to a temperature increase of no more than two degrees Celsius
from pre-industrialization levels, today's high-carbon economy must turn low-
carbon by 2050.2 This will require a complete and rapid transformation of the
energy sector.3 Yet, current projections forecast that renewable energy sources
(renewables) will account for no more than 16 percent of American electricity
generation in 2035.4 In other words, our business-as-usual trajectory is too
slow to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius, despite the American
public's widespread awareness of and concern about climate change. 5
The transition to renewable sources of energy has long ceased to be of
solely environmental relevance but, instead, claims constantly more economic
importance. American dependence on foreign oil drives up the U.S. trade
1. Another factor weighing in favor of a transition to renewable sources of energy is air
pollution, including, but not limited to, greenhouse gases that affect climate change. To the extent any
air pollutant has an effect beyond the greenhouse effect, the scientific, regulatory, and political issues
pertaining to air pollution are outside the scope of this Article.
2. According to numerous peer-reviewed studies of climate change, the two-degree scenario (3.6
degrees Fahrenheit) is crucial to limit the likelihood of massive and irreversible disruptions of the global
ecosystem. For further information, see, for example, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 67, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; Eur. Comm'n, Limiting Global Climate
Change to 2 Degrees Celsius: The Way Ahead for 2020 and Beyond, at 1, 3 COM (2007) 2 final (Oct. 1,
2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0002:FIN:EN:
PDF.
3. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 113 (2009), available at http://www.iea.
org/weo/2009.asp.
4. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 21 (2011), available at http://www.eia.
gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(201 1).pdf
5. More than 50 percent of Americans are "somewhat worried" or "very worried" about global
warming. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE IN
THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS' GLOBAL WARMING BELIEFS AND ATrITUDES IN MAY 2011, at 4
(2011), available at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateBeliefsMay2011 .pdf. To date,
however, awareness is rarely matched by corresponding policy implementation. See Dale Medearis,
Looking Beyond Copenhagen: Sub-National Governments as Transformers of Energy, Climate, and
Transatlantic Policies, in HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG, TOWARD A NEW CLIMATE NETWORK:




deficit, with daily imports worth $1 billion. 6 The 2008 oil price shock cost the
U.S. economy some $500 billion.7 At the same time, the low-carbon energy
market promises huge growth potential. Worldwide investment in solar energy
for instance increased by more than 250 percent annually from 2004 to 2008.8
Clean technology and renewable energy were the only segments to experience
growth in venture capital investment amidst the 2008/09 economic downturn.9
It is of little surprise, therefore, that over the past twenty-five years most
industrially developed nations have adopted policies to promote the shift to
renewables. Almost thirty U.S. states have adopted Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS), which aim to increase the share of renewables in their
respective energy mix. The various promotional measures adopted across the
United States and around the globe differ considerably in their approach to
achieve this goal. Many of the competing views and approaches feature
prominently in the ongoing debate over a comprehensive U.S. climate and
energy policy reform at the federal level.
The task of a timely transition to renewables is one of Herculean
dimensions. The overall cost of a transition to an exclusively renewables-based
electricity sector is estimated at around $100 trillion globally, not including the
necessary investment in transmission infrastructure.' 0 Some have compared the
required effort to the 1960s Space Race.11 In his 2011 State of the Union
address, President Obama referred to the U.S. energy challenges as "our
generation's Sputnik moment." 12 Others speak of an energy revolution. 13 Both
views are right: the quest for the policy that best promotes the shift from fossil
fuels to renewable sources of energy is an international competition over
technological leadership in one of the fastest growing sectors of the global
economy. As the example of Denmark's thriving wind turbine industry
6. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE 8
(2010), available at http://www.americanenergyinnovation.org/full-report.
7. Id. at 10.
8. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 3, at 162; Joan Canton & Asa Johannesson Lind6n,
Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the EU, at 32 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/publications/economic_paper/2010/pdf/ecp408_en.pdf.
9. See News Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Assoc., Global Economic Downturn Driving
Evolution of Venture Capital Industry, According to Study by Deloitte and National Venture Capital
Association (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com-docman&task-
doc_download&gid=455&Itemid=93.
10. Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Path to Sustainable Energy by 2030, SC. AM., Nov.
2009, at 58 (2009), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=a-path-to-
sustainable-energy-by-2030&page=4.
11. JAY INSLEE & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO'S FIRE: IGNITING AMERICA'S CLEAN ENERGY
ECONOMY 2, 3 (2008); Daniel Van Fleet, Legal Approaches to Promote Technological Solutions to
Climate Change, 8 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2008).
12. See Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by the President in State of
Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address.




illustrates, even a relatively small nation has a chance at dominating the world
market when supported by a strong domestic renewables policy. 14 Against this
competitive and time-constrained background, it is quite appropriate therefore
to speak of a race to renewables similar to the 1960s Space Race.
The magnitude of the task at hand requires the concerted efforts of more
than just the scientific and engineering communities. Without the active
involvement of economists, educators, and lawyers, the United States will not
see a shift to renewables at the speed required to successfully mitigate climate
change and will not place favorably in the race to renewables. Indeed, the
necessary institutional and regulatory reforms are so far-reaching that they may
well be described as a renewables revolution.
The challenges of a timely transition from fossil fuels to renewables have
received much attention in the engineering and economic literature. A whole
phalanx of studies discusses the technological feasibility of such a shift.15
Economists investigating the economic implications of climate change and its
mitigation offer a multitude of indicators and models designed to assess and
compare the efficiency of competing policies for the promotion of
renewables. 16 In contrast, the challenges of a timely transition to renewable
sources of energy have so far attracted relatively little attention in the legal
literature. 17 This lack of scholarly interest is all the more surprising given that
14. See Judith Lipp, Lessons for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy from Denmark, Germany
and the United Kingdom, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 5481, 5492 (2007).
15. A comprehensive review of the related engineering literature is beyond the scope of this
Article. For such a discussion, see, for example, Stephen W. Pacala & Robert H. Socolow, Stabilization
Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968
(2004). For an encouraging outlook, see Jacobson & Delucchi, supra note 10, at 58. Jonathan D.
Schneider, So, the World is Getting Warmer: What Now? New Literature on Electric Sector Options and
the Cost of Climate Control Legislation, 30 ENERGY L. J. 553 (2009), discusses two recent feasibility
studies by McKinsey & Co. and the Electric Power Research Institute. ALAN SANGSTER, ENERGY FOR A
WARMING WORLD 77 (2010) offers a less optimistic perspective.
16. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 347
(2007); CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDtN, supra note 8, at 9; Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of
Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 12 EIB PAPERS 110, 117 (2007), available at
http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2007_v12 n02/eibpapers_2007_vl2 nO2aO5
en.pdf; Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and
Investment Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134, 143 (2007), available at http://www.energy.eu/
publications/QHPA12002ENC_002.pdf; Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures:
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 168 (2005); Carolyn Fischer &
Richard G. Newell, Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 142, 145 (2008) (including numerical application of their model to U.S. electricity
production).
17. The heated debate among legal scholars over a national Renewable Portfolio Standard appears
to have left little room for consideration of other promotional policies and, more importantly, the
obstacles they seek to overcome. See, e.g., Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There's No Need to
Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451 (2008); Benjamin K. Sovacool &
Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard
and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85 (2008); Robert J. Lunt, Recharging
U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
2011] 907
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the vast majority of policy measures for the promotion of renewable energy
take the form of laws, decrees, or similar lawmaking products whose proper
design and implementation require substantial legal expertise.18 Moreover, in
order to be successful, promotional policies need to overcome not only a
number of economic obstacles but also a variety of barriers closely related to
regulatory and other legal questions.
Any attempt to promote renewable sources of energy or evaluate such
promotional efforts requires a deep understanding of the obstacles that stand in
the way of a timely transition to renewables. Only once these obstacles are
properly identified can an adequate promotional policy be designed and
implemented to overcome them. Cost competitiveness of renewables in
comparison to fossil fuels may be the most obvious and certainly represents one
key factor for their large-scale deployment. But it is by no means the only
determinative variable in the renewables equation. The comparison of France
and Germany demonstrates that rate structures and financial subsidies alone do
not guarantee the successful promotion of renewable sources of energy. Even
though both countries' promotional policies offer similarly high subsidized
rates for electricity from renewables, deployment in Germany has been several
times greater than in France, pointing to other forces at play than pricing
alone.19 While it may be possible to attach a price tag to such forces or
obstacles, it is doubtful whether convincing renewables entrepreneurs to go
forward with their projects solely through price incentives is efficient or even
politically viable in the long run. Already, some of the pioneering nations in
renewables have been forced to cut support programs so as not to let the cost of
their promotional efforts get out of hand.20 The current U.S. budget crisis
POL'Y 371 (2007); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L. J. 49 (2008).
To the extent other promotional policies feature in the legal literature, it is usually in the broader
context of climate change policies. See, e.g., Van Fleet, supra note 11 (providing a cursory overview of
climate change policies in general); Neil Craik & Joseph F. C. Dimento, Climate Law and Policy in
North America: Prospect for Regionalism, I SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 195 (2009)
(examining the status quo and future potential for climate-change governance in North America);
Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy through Energy Efficiency,
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711
(2010) (discussing renewables along with energy efficiency and electricity transmission); Andrew
Schatz, A Tale of Three Signatories: Learning from the European Union, Japanese, and Canadian
Kyoto Experiences in Crafting a Superior United States Climate Change Regime, 70 U. PITT. L. REV.
593 (2009) (employing a similarly holistic but more comparative approach).
18. Tender schemes, certificate trading schemes, and feed-in tariffs all require a relatively
complex regulatory framework, while the legal ramifications tend to be less complicated in the case of
tax incentives. For details on each of these regimes, see the discussion infra in Part IV.
19. This observation is all the more surprising when considering that France's climate provides
more favorable conditions for the siting of renewables technologies like solar and wind. See INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES 67 (2008), available
at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/DeployingRenewables2008.pdf
20. For example, France recently imposed a moratorium on solar PV installations to counter what
the Prime Minister referred to as a "veritable speculative bubble." Solar Feed in Tariff in France Halted
as Renewable Energy Subsidies Become "veritable speculative bubble," GREEN WORLD INVESTOR
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requires cost-efficient policy support for renewables. It is therefore crucial that,
to the extent possible, we eliminate obstacles to the large-scale deployment of
renewables rather than compensate for them. Elimination, however, requires
prior identification and evaluation.
This Article explores the underlying challenges to the electricity sector's
timely transition from fossil fuels to renewables and offers design
recommendations for a comprehensive U.S. renewables policy. Its prescriptive
approach assumes the timely transition to renewables is an imperative
mandated by the need to mitigate climate change. 21 Part I of this Article opens
with a definition of renewable sources of energy and an illustration of the
electricity sector's key role in climate change mitigation. Part II discusses the
obstacles that hinder a timely transition to renewables. Part III offers an
explanation why emission pricing alone will not be sufficient to overcome
these obstacles. Part IV develops policy design recommendations for the
successful transition to a renewables-based electricity sector in the United
States. Against this background, the Article concludes with a call for concerted
policy action with greater involvement of the legal profession.
I. DEFINING RENEWABLES AND THEIR ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE
The definition of renewable sources of energy varies between and, in some
cases, within jurisdictions. 22 While variations are usually minor, one major
point of contention is whether to qualify energy derived from nuclear fission
(or fusion) as renewable. 23 The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(Dec. 4, 2010), http://greenworldinvestor.com/2010/12/04/solar-feed-in-tariff-in-france-halted-as-
renewable-energy-subsidies-become-"veritable-speculative-bubble"/. The recently passed Electricity
Supply Amendment (Solar Bonus Scheme) Bill 2010 by the Australian state legislature in New South
Wales slashed the feed-in tariff paid for electricity from solar photovoltaics by two thirds. See Electricity
Supply Amendment (Solar Bonus Scheme) Bill 2010 (NSW) (Austl.), available at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/nswbills.nsf/0/19fb0bc70903af43ca2577c900053a79/
$FILE/b2010-138-dl6-HOUSE.pdf The Czech Republic cut its feed-in tariffs support for solar by 50
percent. See New Czech Renewable Energy Policy to Bust the Solar Boom with a 50% Subsidy Cut,
GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (Aug. 27, 2010), http://greenworldinvestor.com/2010/08/27/new-czech-
renewable-energy-policy-to-bust-the-solar-boom-with-a-50-subsidy-cut/. Similar, albeit less drastic,
measures are a topic of debate in Germany. German Feed-in Tariff to Reduce in Two Phases?,
RENEWABLE ENERGY Focus (July 6, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/10775/
german-feedin-tariff-fit-to-reduce-in-two-phases/.
21. A thorough discussion of the environmental benefits of renewable sources of energy is beyond
the scope of this work; for an overview, see Mark Z. Jacobson, Review of Solutions to Global Warming,
Air Pollution, and Energy Security, 2 ENERGY ENVTL. SC. 148 (2009).
22. Austria is a prominent example of a country with such an intra-jurisdictional variety of
definitions for renewables. See DANYEL REICHE, HANDBOOK OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, VOL. 1, at 37 (2002). Similarly, coal-producing Pennsylvania is the only state within
the United States to count mining waste and "clean coal" as renewables. See Robert J. Michaels,
National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 82
(2008).
23. See DAVID J. C. MACKAY, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY-WITHOUT THE HOT AIR 22, 162 (2009).
Some states include nuclear technology in their RPS; for an overview, see Lincoln L. Davies, Power
Forward: The Argumentfor a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1340, 1361, 1367 (2010).
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defines renewables as sources of energy "that are naturally replenishing but
flow limited. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the
amount of energy that is available per unit of time. Renewable energy sources
include: biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave action
and tidal action." 24 This Article follows the Energy Information
Administration's definition and does not consider nuclear power a renewable
source of energy.
Renewable energy must not be confused with clean energy. Clean energy
generally refers to power production that is non-polluting, especially regarding
the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 25 "Clean energy"
has a broader meaning than "renewable energy." For instance, nuclear fission 26
is considered to be a clean source of energy because it emits very little carbon
dioxide. Similarly, natural gas and coal are commonly qualified as sources of
clean energy, provided that carbon sequestration and other technologies
drastically reduce or eliminate the emission of greenhouse gases and other
pollutants emanating from conventional gas and coal plants. 27 I deliberately
focus on sources of energy that are not only clean, but also renewable. 28
24. See Renewable and Alternative Fuels: Renewable Energy Consumption and Electricity
Preliminary 2006 Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/
page/prelim-trends/rea prereport.html#_ftnref20 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
25. President Obama's 2011 State of the Union Address exemplifies the variations of and
controversy over the definition of clean energy: "Some folks want wind and solar. Others want nuclear,
clean coal and natural gas." Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by the
President in State of Union Address, (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
26. Nuclear fusion has yet to be mastered for use as an energy source. As Sebastian Balibar, the
Director of the French National Center for Scientific Research put it: "We say that we will put the sun
into a box. The idea is pretty. The problem is, we don't know how to make that box." MACKAY, supra
note 23, at 172.
27. For an introduction to carbon sequestration, see NAT'L SCI. BD., BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY FUTURE: U.S. ACTIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE ENERGY ECONOMY TRANSFORMATION 23 (2009),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2009/nsb0955/nsb0955.pdf. Contrary to the view of West Virginia
Senator Joe Manchin, carbon sequestration does not make coal a renewable-that is, virtually
inexhaustible-source of energy. See Vicki Smith, Manchin Says Reid Vows Cap-and-Trade Bill Is
Dead, BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9JHE4U80.htm.
28. A thorough discussion of nuclear, clean coal, and gas is beyond the scope of this Article. It
should be noted, however, that there is cause for doubt whether the promotion of energy from these (so-
called) clean, but non-renewable sources is a worthwhile endeavor. To replace the current high-carbon
energy production infrastructure with (supposedly) carbon-neutral facilities relying on nuclear fission,
clean gas and coal would require substantial investment. For example, if nuclear power is to play a
significant role in climate change mitigation, nearly 3,000 new reactors will have to be commissioned.
See MACKAY, supra note 23, at 171. Yet, nuclear fission, clean coal and gas are no more than bridge
technologies. While the U.S. and global reserves of gas and coal are vast, they are nonetheless limited,
as is easily accessible uranium. It is questionable whether we should direct our scarce funds for energy
investment toward technologies that do not have the capacity to resolve but will only postpone our
energy supply issues. Moreover, the qualification of clean coal, gas and nuclear fission as clean sources
of energy may be the result of an erroneously narrow view of their environmental impact. All three are
carbon-neutral and non-polluting only during the actual process of electricity generation. Gas extraction
and coal mining are known to release significant amounts of greenhouse gases such as methane, carbon
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Renewable sources of energy are relevant not only to electricity generation
but also to other sectors of the energy market, such as heat and transport. The
latter especially features prominently in the public debate over ever stricter
fuel-economy standards mandated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 29 Notwithstanding the importance of renewable energy sources
for heat and transport, this Article focuses on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions as necessary to mitigate climate change through the timely transition
to renewables in the electricity sector. From 1990 to 2008, electricity
generation accounted for 32 percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,
placing the electricity sector at the top of the emitters' list, ahead of the
transport sector, which is responsible for 27 percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. 30 Globally, the energy sector accounts for 73 percent of greenhouse
gas emissions, with the agricultural sector assuming a distant second place
responsible for 16 percent. 31
With U.S. and global electricity generation expected to increase by 22
percent and 74 percent respectively until 2030,32 any effort to significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include major reforms in the electricity
sector. A timely shift to renewable sources is the only long-term sustainable
solution presently available. 33 Moreover, the projected growth in electricity
generation will easily be surpassed if the current trend towards electric vehicles
(e.g., plug-in hybrids) continues. 34 The resulting large-scale electrification of
monoxide, and carbon dioxide. For climate change, leakage of a mere 5 percent of natural gas during
extraction is equivalent to a 40 percent boost in carbon dioxide. See MACKAY, supra note 23, at 158.
Furthermore, we have yet to find an environmentally sustainable solution for the storage or recycling of
nuclear bum elements, not to mention the environmental risks of accidents in nuclear power plants. See,
e.g., AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 17.
29. See, e.g., EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE HISTORIC NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR CARS AND TRUCKS, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420fl0014.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
30. EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/indicators/pdfs/Climatelndicators full.pdf; see also Benjamin K.
Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy: Tripping the Horse with
the Cart, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 5 (2007) ("Of all American industries, electricity generation
is-by substantial margins-the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for global
warming.").
31. EPA, supra note 30, at 13.
32. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 3, at 623, 629.
33. For a convincing study on the feasibility of a complete shift to renewable energy by 2030, see
Jacobson & Delucchi, supra note 10, at 58. Nuclear energy could also play a role but would first have to
overcome fundamental environmental and security concerns. See WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13,
at 29 ("[A]ny major expansion of nuclear energy in the United States will have to overcome a legacy of
public distrust, as well as critical waste-storage and security issues."); see also Lunt, supra note 17,
at 377; Karsten Neuhoff, Large-Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation, 21
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 88, 91 (2005). For a comprehensive list of potential problems with a nuclear
renaissance in the United States, see Roland M. Frye Jr., The Current "Nuclear Renaissance" in the
United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279, 356 (2008).
34. For a discussion of the electrification of the transport and heating sectors, see Jacobson &
Delucchi, supra note 10, at 62; MACKAY, supra note 23, at 117 (advocating the widespread
electrification of the heat sector through electric heat pumps).
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the transport sector would further increase the need for a timely
decarbonization of the electricity sector. Otherwise greenhouse gas emissions
may merely move from one sector (transport) to another, only slightly less
carbon-intensive sector (electricity). While improvements in energy efficiency
will also be important, 35 the timely shift to renewables is essential if current
efforts in climate change mitigation are to be successful. 36
Fortunately, the case for rapid large-scale deployment of renewables in the
electricity sector is not one of necessity only but of potential, too. In
comparison to the fragmented structure of the heat-relevant building sector, for
instance, the electricity sector is relatively centralized and, hence, easier to
regulate and reform.37 Indeed, a recent study found that meeting the world's
entire demand with electricity generated from water, wind, and sunlight is
technologically feasible as early as twenty years from today. 38 Accordingly,
this Article focuses on the use of renewables for the generation of electricity.
II. OBSTACLES TO A TIMELY TRANSITION TO ELECTRICITY FROM
RENEWABLES
The world's decreasing oil reserves, ever stricter air pollution regulation,
and struggles over supply channels for coal and natural gas across the globe
lead to increasing prices for electricity derived from fossil fuels. 39 At the same
time, technological advances drive down the cost of electricity generated from
renewable sources of energy. 40 The question, therefore, is whether market
forces alone can bring about the transition from fossil fuels to renewable
sources of energy. Indeed, it seems to be only a matter of time before the more
mature renewables technologies become cost-competitive with fossil fuels.
Under favorable conditions, the production cost of electricity from onshore
wind turbines is already competitive with that of many coal-fired plants. 41
35. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 90.
36. Staffan Jacobsson et al., EU Renewable Energy Support Policy: Faith or Facts?, 37 ENERGY
POL'Y 2143 (2009); Doerte Fouquet & Thomas B. Johansson, European Renewable Energy Policy at
Crossroads-Focus on Electricity Support Mechanisms, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 4079, 4091 (2008); Fischer
& Newell, supra note 16, at 145.
37. See also WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 37.
38. Jacobson & Delucchi, supra note 10, at 64.
39. The enormous price-relevance of coal and gas distribution was well illustrated in January 2009
when Russia, in a political dispute with Ukraine, suspended its gas shipments to Europe and scarcity of
supply drove prices up. See David Jolly, Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute into a 10th Day, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/world/europe/15iht-16gazprom.19385328.
html.
40. See CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDEN, supra note 8, at 4.
41. See id. at 14 (providing an overview of the production costs of electricity for different sources
of energy, including projections for future price developments based on the European Union's Cost
Assessments for Sustainable Energy Research Markets (CASES) research project). For more detail, see
Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan:
Energy Sources, Production Costs, and Performance of Technologies for Power Generation, Heating
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Nonetheless, market forces alone appear insufficient to drive the shift to
renewables in the global and U.S. electricity mix at the speed necessary for
successful climate change mitigation. 42
Today's high-carbon economy must turn low-carbon by 2050 in order to
limit global warming to a temperature increase of no more than two degrees
Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) from pre-industrialization levels.43 Several
peer-reviewed studies of climate change indicate the two-degree scenario as a
crucial milestone to limit the likelihood of massive and irreversible disruptions
of the global ecosystem.44 Following these studies, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change correlates the two-degree scenario with a stabilization
of the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration below 440 parts per million.45
The necessary rate of renewables deployment to achieve this stabilization level
depends upon a variety of factors, including the overall energy consumption,
energy efficiency measures, the choice of conventional fuels and their carbon
intensity. Model scenarios require a global renewable energy share of up to 43
percent by 2030 and 77 percent by 2050.46 According to the International
Energy Agency (IEA), "to achieve this[] would require a complete and rapid
transformation of the energy sector."47
Yet, even the European Union (E.U.), one of the world's most zealous
advocates of a timely transition to renewables, assumes a share of no more than
20 percent for renewable energy sources in the energy mix of its twenty-seven
member states by 2020, based on a business-as-usual scenario. 48 In fact, the
and Transport: Technical Report, COM (2008) 781 final, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2008:
2872:FIN:EN:PDF; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 19, at 79.
42. See Fouquet & Johansson, supra note 36, at 4091; Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 135, 158;
Van Fleet, supra note 11, at 4. For the urgency of a timely transition to a low-carbon economy, see
STERN, supra note 16, at 2 ("An overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that
climate change is a serious and urgent issue."). For convincing arguments why climate change does not
afford the luxury of leaving anything to chance, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND
RESPONSE 163 (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 119 (2007).
43. For further details regarding the carbon intensity of today's economy and the two-degree
scenario, see, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 67; EUR.
COMM'N, supra note 2, at 3.
44. For a synthesis, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 48.
45. See id. at 66, 67. For 2010, the annual average greenhouse gas concentration was 388.5 parts
per million. T.J. Blasing, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations (Aug. 2011),
http://cdiac.oml.gov/pns/currentghg.html.
46. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLE ENERGY
SOURCES-SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 19 (2011), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/news-and_
events/docs/ipcc33/SRRENFDSPM final.pdf (including an overview of the wide spread of model
scenarios).
47. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4, at 113.
48. CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDEN, supra note 8, at 5. Similarly, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries estimates that by 2030 fossil fuels will still account for 80 percent of the
world's energy consumption See ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, WORLD OIL




E.U. member states plan to commission fifty new coal-fired power plants in the
near future, and these plants will likely remain on the grid for up to fifty
years. 49 Current projections by the U.S. Energy Information Administration
predict a very gradual shift to lower carbon options 50-too slow to limit global
warming to two degrees Celsius. Already, some climate change researchers
already doubt whether the current policy landscape will be able to keep global
warming below three degrees Celsius. 51
The economic literature tends to attribute the relatively moderate market-
driven growth of renewables' share in the electricity mix of the European
Union, the United States, and elsewhere in the world to market failures. Along
with other imperfections and characteristics of the electricity market, these
failures are perceived to favor incumbent fossil fuel technologies and thus
block the rise of renewables. This Part discusses the most widely blamed
market failures, imperfections, and other characteristics in the context of the
U.S. electricity market. The discussion places special emphasis on the role of
regulatory obstacles. Based on their alleged impact on the timely transition to
renewables, I have categorized these obstacles into impediments to innovation,
discussed in Part II.A, and barriers to renewables' entry into the electricity
market, discussed in Parts II.B and II.C.
A. Impediments to Innovation
Most renewable energy technologies have not yet reached the stage of
market maturity.52 The diversified portfolio of renewables favored by
environmentalists and advocates of energy security will not be available
without substantial research and innovation. 53 In addition, many of the more
mature technologies, including onshore wind and solar photovoltaic, cannot be
successfully integrated into the on-grid electricity market without further
technological advances in related fields, such as energy storage and
49. For more information on this looming carbon renaissance, see Schatz, supra note 17, at 603.
Conversely, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries assumes that coal will remain the
second most important source of energy through 2030. ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES, supra note 48, at 48.
50. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 9.
51. Joeri Rogelj et al., Copenhagen Accord Pledges Are Paltry, 464 NATURE 1126 (2010).
52. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 89, distinguishes between three groups of technologies-the mature
generation, including hydropower and biomass combustion, the emerging generation, including solar
photovoltaics and wind, and those technologies still in the R&D phase, such as ocean energy and
advanced forms of bioenergy. See also Van Fleet, supra note 11, at 8 ("[M]ore radical technological
advancements are needed to fully address climate change.").
53. There is a multitude of competing definitions and models to explain the process of innovation.
See, e.g., WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 16. This Article refers to innovation consistent with
Schumpeter's definition of a three-staged innovation process, which distinguishes between invention as
an idea's first practical demonstration, innovation as its first commercial application, and diffusion as
the market penetration of a technology or process. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT (R. Opie trans., 1934) (applying a broad definition, referring to innovation as
technological advance in general).
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transmission. 54 Finally, continuous research and innovation, including the
exploration of new, hitherto purely conceptual technologies, are essential to
ensure that the shift away from fossil fuels to renewables does not replace one
path dependency with another by focusing on too few renewable energy
technologies. 55 The transport sector provides an instructive example of the
risks involved in prematurely narrowing climate change mitigation efforts to a
single technology: the recent focus on biofuels derived from corn, sugar cane,
and other food crops-praised by some as the transport sector's energy
panacea-resulted in a crop scarcity that drove food prices up to a level that
threatened to bring famine to many developing countries. 56
The need for further innovation in renewables is exacerbated by
traditionally low levels of research and development (R&D) in the energy
sector. In 2007, the R&D intensity57 of U.S. energy firms was at 0.23 percent
while other industries, such as information technology (15 percent),
semiconductors (16 percent), and pharmaceuticals (20 percent) featured a
several orders of magnitude higher R&D intensity. 58 After a brief surge
following the 1970s oil crisis, private and public energy R&D expenditures
have declined consistently. 59 Private R&D expenditures are driven by the
firm's expected returns on investment. The energy sector's low level of R&D
investment indicates the presence of impediments to the firm's ability to profit
from innovation, which discourage the firm's innovative efforts. Some of these
impediments, such as spillover effects, as discussed in Part II.A.1, point to
general market failures related to innovation with particular implications for
renewables. Others, like the prevailing regime of electricity rate regulation, as
discussed in Part II.A.2, appear to be specific to the innovative process in
54. For an overview of the many adjustments and innovations required for the integration of
renewable into the electric grid, see Jeffery S. Dennis & Florence K. S. Davis, Report of the Renewable
Energy & Demand-Side Management Committee, 31 ENERGY L.J. 287, 294 (2010).
55. See Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 171; STERN, supra note 16, at 358. Others stress that the
magnitude of the transformation makes support for multiple technologies inevitable. See Jacobsson et
al., supra note 36, at 2144; see also Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 261,
269 (2005) ("The same over-weighted reliance on oil in the 1970s is being repeated now with natural
gas, albeit for environmentally motivated reasons.").
56. See WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 28; Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REv. 1425, 1437 (2010). For a discussion of related risks
regarding the use of biomass for electricity generation, see Craig A. Hart & M. L. Rajora, Overcoming
Institutional Barriers to Biomass Power in China and India, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 26
(2009); see also Elizabeth Weise, Ethanol Pumping Up Food Prices, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2011, at 3B,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2011-02-09-corn-lowN.htm.
57. The term "R&D intensity" refers to R&D as a share of net sales. See NAT'L SC. BD., SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 4-18 (2010), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
seindl0/pdf/seindl0.pdf.
58. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL GAPS IN CLEAN ENERGY R&D: REPORT FOR THE CLEAN
ENERGY MINISTERIAL 9 (2010).
59. See STERN, supra note 16, at 352, 372; Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Liberalisation and
R&D in Network Industries: The Case of the Electricity Industry, 37 RES. POLY 995, 996 (2008).
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renewables. Finally, the dearth of outside funding, as discussed in Part II.A.3,
exacerbates the problem of insufficient R&D investment in renewables.
1. Spillover Effects
Spillover effects are among the most common market failures responsible
for an undersupply of innovation. When a firm invests in a new technology, it
is generally unable to reap all of the resulting benefits for itself, but creates
benefits for others, too. Yet the firm bears the entire cost. As a result of this
spillover effect, profit-oriented firms will keep their investments in innovation
below the socially optimal level. The benefits subject to such spillover usually
involve the knowledge and learning experience a firm has acquired through its
innovation efforts. 60 Knowledge spillover is not a problem specific to
renewables, but is innate in all innovative efforts, and affects the energy
industry just as much as the pharmaceuticals, semiconductor, or automotive
sectors. Yet, all of these sectors feature R&D intensities several orders of
magnitude higher than the energy sector. 61 One could argue, therefore, that
knowledge spillover should not represent a major impediment to innovation in
the renewables nexus. This view, however, underestimates the special
characteristics of the electricity market-a market dominated by powerful
incumbents with little interest in out-innovating their established fossil-fuel
power-generation infrastructure. Thanks to their substantial resources, these
incumbents can wait to jump on the energy innovation bandwagon once it has
gathered momentum. 62
In addition to the general issue of knowledge spillover, innovation in
renewable energy technologies is prone to another, industry-specific spillover
effect: so long as high-carbon energy technologies are not held accountable for
their emissions, they will continue to externalize the environmental costs of
their activities. Just as these environmental costs are borne by society at large,
so will the environmental benefits created by renewable energy technologies
accrue to the general public. Ratepayers will be reluctant to pay a premium for
electricity from renewables so as not to offer a free ride to those who continue
to rely on cheaper electricity from polluting fossil fuels. 63 As a result of this
environmental spillover effect, innovators in the renewables nexus have a hard
time cashing in on their innovative achievements. 64
60. For a discussion of these knowledge externalities, see Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 143;
Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 98; Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 166.
61. See discussion supra Part II.A.
62. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
63. See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 30, at 5; JOSHUA P. FERSHEE, supra note 17, at 74.
64. For a detailed discussion of the interplay between the knowledge and environmental spillover
effects related to renewables, see Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 166; see also Sovacool & Cooper, supra
note 30, at 5.
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2. Rate Regulation Discourages In-House Innovation
The general disincentivizing force of fossil fuels' environmental
externalities on investment in renewables innovation could be remedied, at
least in part, if the established and powerful energy incumbents had sufficient
incentives for in-house renewables innovation. That way, those who benefit
most from the hidden subsidy of environmental externalization could use their
windfall profits to innovate toward the transition to renewables. Such vertically
integrated approaches to innovation are, however, few and far between, as
evidenced by the energy sector's low R&D intensity. In the absence of
consistent, long-term support policies, the current rate structure in the
electricity market tends to discourage investment in R&D for emerging
renewables technologies. Subject to approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), which regulates the wholesale market, and State Public
Utilities Commissions, which regulate the retail market, electricity rates in the
United States are generally based on rate-of-return regulation. Under this
regulatory approach, the responsible commissions approve electricity rates
based on the cost of service, offering an allowed rate of return to the electric
utilities companies. While this rate structure encourages capital expenditures
beyond the socially optimal level, known as the Averch-Johnson effect,6 5 it
does not necessarily incentivize R&D investment. In fact, the commissions
rarely include R&D expenditures in their rate-base calculations or allow
utilities to earn a return on investment on them.66 It is hardly surprising
therefore that several studies have shown regulation to be harmful to utilities'
R&D spending and innovation. 67 Historically, equipment manufacturers and
the federal government-not utilities-have been the drivers of technological
innovation in the U.S. electricity industry. 68 As early as 1969, now-Judge
Posner warned of the effects of rate regulation on innovation:
There would be no monopoly profits under such a regime, but neither
would there be any incentive on the part of the monopolist to improve his
efficiency. Lacking either the "stick" of competitive pressure or the
"carrot" of supracompetitive profits, the managers of the firm would have
no reason to strive for better performance save their own pride or
professionalism. 69
Even if utility companies do engage in R&D, they are likely to focus on
areas with high short-term potential for commercialization, thus excluding most
65. The Averch-Johnson effect was established in Harvey Averch & L. Johnson Leland, Behavior
of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962).
66. Jarnasb & Pollitt, supra note 59, at 1005.
67. See, e.g., Mark W. Frank, An Empirical Analysis of Electricity Regulation on Technical
Change in Texas, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 313, 315 (2003); John W. Mayo & Joseph E. Flynn, The Effects
ofRegulation on Research and Development: Theory and Evidence, 61 J. Bus. 321, 331 (1988).
68. Jarnasb & Pollitt, supra note 59, at 1003.
69. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 597 (1969).
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renewables technologies. 70 Electric utilities with the resources for in-house
innovation may well decide to wait until extrasectorial efforts advance
renewable energy technologies sufficiently for commercial application. In fact,
large, vertically integrated incumbents have a strong motivation to delay
renewables innovation as much as possible so as not to depreciate the value of
their existing electricity-generation assets. 71 Relying on their position of
market power and their considerable resources, they can afford to wait until
extrasectorial innovation brings emerging technologies to maturity to then jump
on the bandwagon through, for example, licensing, reverse engineering, or
company take-overs. 72 FERC's recent ruling on California's proposed feed-in
tariff reflects both the necessity of policy support for innovation and strategic
deployment of renewables as well as the difficulty of its implementation under
the existing regulatory framework. 73
3. Difficulty to Raise Outside Funding
The characteristics of the energy sector in general, and of renewables in
particular, make them ill-suited for traditional models of outside funding, such
as the venture capital that has proven a successful driver of innovation in the
information technology sector. Outside investors are not only wary of the risks
resulting from the double spillover effects illustrated above, but are also
reluctant to invest in technologies whose economic success depends largely on
the regulatory choices of policymakers. 74 This reluctance is exacerbated by a
history of policy choices that have lacked the consistency required to afford the
necessary investment certainty. The sequence of boom and bust cycles resulting
from intermittent tax support for U.S. wind energy projects is a prime example
of the destructive effects of this lack of policy certainty. 75 As a result, investors
demonstrate a relatively high level of risk-aversion regarding investments in
renewable energy.
Finally, many of the technologies required to facilitate a successful
transition to renewables involve innovative efforts of such scale and complexity
70. Jamasb & Pollitt, supra note 59, at 998.
71. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 95.
72. See, for example, the recent acquisition of a majority stake in solar manufacturer SunPower by
French oil major Total. Craig Morris, Total Takes Over Sunpower, RENEWABLES INT'L (June 6, 2011),
http://www.renewablesintemational.net/total-takes-over-sunpower/150/510/31189/
73. See California Public Utilities Commission, 132 FERC 1 61,047 (2010); California Public
Utilities Commission, 133 FERC 61,059 (2010) (clarifying 132 FERC 1 61,047); see also infra Part
IV.B.2 for a detailed discussion.
74. As one venture capitalist described it in a personal interview with the author: "We are
reluctant to invest in ventures whose success depends on the kindness of strangers."
75. See MIGUEL MENDONCA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN TARIFF
HANDBOOK 172 (2009); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 19, at 108; Bent Ole Gram Mortenson,
International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 179, 183 (2008). For
further discussion of the importance of policy continuity for investment in renewable energy innovation,
see Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 101; STERN, supra note 16, at 35, 352; Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 167.
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that they exceed most outside investors' patience. Venture capital funds, for
instance, are expected to yield returns to their investors within a period of no
more than five to ten years. 76 In light of the energy sector's history of long
learning processes,77 it is doubtful whether renewable energy technologies,
without policy assistance, can attract the venture capital or other private
investment necessary to bridge the notoriously long valley of death between
proof of concept and late-stage development. The current level of venture
capital investment in renewable energy technologies, although on the rise, is far
from sufficient to satisfy the sector's need for capital infusion. 78
B. Marketplace Barriers to Entry
Impediments to the innovative process are not the only obstacles to a
timely transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. Even when
the level of innovation is such that renewable energy technologies become
mature enough for their large-scale deployment, they have to overcome a
number of economic barriers to successfully enter the electricity generation
market. Where renewables compete with fossil fuels, they encounter an uneven
playing field, tilted in favor of long-established, deeply entrenched incumbents.
The latter benefit from a history of fossil fuel subsidies, discussed in Part
II.B.1, a lack of product differentiation, discussed in Part II.B.2, and structural
peculiarities of the electricity market, discussed in Part II.B.3.
1. A History of Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Across the globe, the generation of electricity from fossil fuels has long
received and continues to receive substantial government subsidies, both direct
and indirect. In fact, direct financial support for fossil fuels is estimated at $150
billion to $250 billion annually worldwide. 79 In addition, producers of
electricity from fossil fuels benefit from a multitude of indirect subsidies,
ranging from tax privileges over export credit guarantees to government
underwriting of power plant accidents.80 Most of all, in the absence of an
emissions tax or a cap-and-trade system, energy incumbents are permitted to
shift the environmental costs of their activities to society at large.
76. Most venture capital investments have a finite lifetime of ten years with a few years of
optional extension. As funds tend to be drawn to invest over the first five years, the overall investment
time span before the need to exit is limited. See ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE
FINANCE OF INNOVATION 21 (2007).
77. WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 31, 40; Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 98.
78. STERN, supra note 16, at 372; Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 145. For instance, Jacobson &
Delucchi estimate necessary investments of $100 trillion for the next twenty years. Jacobson &
Delucchi, supra note 10, at 64.
79. STERN, supra note 16, at 367.
80. WEIss & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 29; Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 93.
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Subsidies tend to be highest in developing and transition economies to
keep domestic electricity rates low for the benefit of low-income households. 81
In practice, however, these rates mostly benefit affluent households and
industrial electricity consumers, who tend to consume more electricity. Thus,
these energy subsidies tend to foster increased energy consumption while
delaying investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. 82
They have brought forth economically and politically powerful energy
incumbents and given rise to a political culture that assumes fossil fuels to be
the basis of the economy. 83 The result, in the words of two commentators, is a
deeply felt public sense of entitlement "that cheap and readily available energy
is part of the American birthright." 84
2. Lack of Product Differentiation
The distortive effects of government subsidies on electricity rates are all
the more problematic for producers of electricity from renewable energy
sources as they are forced to compete with fossil fuel incumbents primarily on
price. In the absence of a tax on emissions or a cap-and-trade system,
renewable energy technologies appear to deliver the same product-
electricity-as polluting, fossil fuel technologies, at least in the eyes of most
consumers. As two commentators put it: "Liberalisation has transformed
electricity from a public service to a commodity which is technically
homogeneous." 85 In other words, consumers cannot normally distinguish a
green electron from one dressed in charcoal grey. 86 Some utilities offer special
rates for electricity from renewables aimed at consumers who are
environmentally conscious enough-and wealthy enough-to pay a premium
for green electricity. 87 However, demand for these programs has been much
lower than surveys had previously indicated. While one in three electricity
consumers had expressed a willingness to pay extra for clean energy, far fewer
eventually subscribed to a more expensive, renewables-based electricity rate
plan.88
In contrast to the information technology or telecommunication sectors,
product differentiation, such as through reduction in size or enhanced
functionality, is not among the marketing instruments readily available to
81. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 93.
82. Id.
83. WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 28.
84. Id. The public endorsement of this entitlement to affordable energy is reflected in the
electricity rate regulation through the responsible utilities commissions. See discussion supra Part II.B. .
85. Jamasb & Pollitt, supra note 59, at 998.
86. See, e.g., Lunt, supra note 17, at 383 ("The electricity delivered into the grid is the same
whether it was generated by wind, sun, coal, or nuclear means.").
87. For an overview of these voluntary green pricing programs, see LORI BIRD & JENNY SUMNER,
NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORIES, GREEN POWER MARKETING IN THE UNITED STATES: A
STATUS REPORT 1 (2010).
88. Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 144.
920 [Vol. 38:903
RENEWABLES REVOLUTION
producers of electricity from renewable sources of energy.89 Without
distinguishing properties visible to the outside world, such as neighbors,
friends, or clients, environmental enthusiasts paying extra for clean electricity
likely feel cheated out of the recognition their efforts deserve. 90 This trend is
all the more unfortunate as, in economic terms, a cleaner environment is a
public good whose lack of appropriability implies that demand for green
electricity sold at a premium will fall short of the socially optimal level. 91
3. The Electricity Market's Physical and Virtual Barriers to Entry
Other barriers to the entry of renewables relate to the market structure of
the electricity sector. Despite recent efforts to deregulate and liberalize the
sector, the regionally or nationally defined power generation markets around
the world still tend to be dominated by a limited number of big players, and in
some cases by only one formerly government-run utilities company.9 2 In the
absence of special incentives, these incumbents will be reluctant to give up
their costly, well-established infrastructure of fossil fuel power plants for an
increased share of renewables in their energy portfolio. Producers of electricity
from renewable sources who enter the market will likely find themselves in a
competition similar to that of David versus Goliath. To make matters worse,
they need access to the grid in order to sell their power. Electricity distribution,
however, represents a natural monopoly.93 Without a strong regulatory
obligation to grant grid access to incoming players, producers of electricity
from renewables are therefore left at the mercy of local network operators, who
themselves tend to be electricity producers eager to eliminate additional
competition.94
Successful grid integration of renewables depends not only on the local
provider's obligation to grant access to its network, but, just as importantly, on
89. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 98.
90. "People want to be seen to be green. The Japanese who buy fake solar panels don't ask
about the payback period." Tom Konrad, Why Energy Efficiency Is a Hard Sell, Alt Energy Stocks
(Aug. 19, 2007 3:17 PM), http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2007/08/whyenergy efficiency
is a hard sell 2.html.
91. Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 144.
92. STERN, supra note 16, at 355; Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 94.
93. See GARY D. ALLISON & JOHN L. WILLIAMS, THE EFFECTS OF STATE LAWS AND
REGULATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY, 7-8
(2010).
94. FERC Rules 2003 and 2006 aim to establish non-discriminatory access to the grid for
incoming generators. In practice, the interpretation and application of these Rules by utilities and
network operators vary considerably. Also, FERC lacks authority to mandate non-discriminatory grid
access at the distributional, low-voltage level. See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 475 F.3d 1277, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As a result, U.S. renewables project
developers rank grid access as the second most important factor in their investment decision (after
remuneration). See SONJA LOTHI & THOMAS PRASSLER, Analyzing Policy Support Instruments and
Regulatory Risk Factors for Wind Energy Deployment-A Developers' Perspective, 39 ENERGY POL'Y
4876, 4887, 4890 (2011).
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how the connection costs are distributed. The electricity market literature
distinguishes between three different cost allocation models. 95 Under the
"deep" connection charging approach, the incoming power producer bears the
cost for the transmission lines connecting the new plant to the grid as well as
any grid reinforcements the newly added capacity may require. The "shallow"
connection charging model requires the new power generator to pay only for
the new electricity line to the closest grid connection point, while the grid
operator is responsible for any upgrades to the grid infrastructure. At the
extreme end of the cost allocation spectrum, the "super-shallow" approach
requires the grid operator to pay for the connection to the new power plant and
necessary grid reinforcement measures. Figure 1 illustrates these cost allocation
models.
Now connection
RES-E line Existing Grid
Technology I Infrastructure
.2 Super - Shallow
Shallow
0 Deep
FIGURE 1. COST ALLOCATION MODELS FOR GRID CONNECTION OF
RENEWABLES PLANTS (RES-E) 96
Traditionally, the "deep" connection charging practice has worked well for
conventional large-scale plants, such as nuclear or coal-fired facilities.97 In
relation to the overall cost of investment and the enormous output capacity of
these projects, the financial burden of grid connection and reinforcement tends
to be negligible. Furthermore, conventional power plants are far more flexible
in their siting than, for instance, hydroelectric, wind or solar power plants that
require very specific siting conditions to ensure the availability of the energy
resource they aim to harness. As a result, fossil fuel power plant projects can
limit the cost of grid access because their choice of location is less resource-
dependent, and they can be sited based on existing grid availability, location,
and capacity.
While the "deep" connection charging approach may make sense for
conventional power plants, it represents a huge barrier to the deployment of





plants that rely on renewable sources of energy.98 The generally smaller scale
of renewables projects renders the cost of connection a much heavier burden
relative to the plant capacity, thereby threatening its profitability. For offshore
wind energy projects, for instance, the cost of grid connection can account for
more than 25 percent of the overall investment cost. 99 Many renewables, such
as hydroelectric, wind, or solar power plants have very particular operating
conditions that often require siting away from established grid networks. In
addition, the intermittency of wind and solar energy is likely to require
substantial grid reinforcements to handle the load peaks when these plants are
operating at full capacity. Therefore, the cost of connection for many
renewables plants is likely to be higher than for conventional plants, even in
absolute terms. Successful grid integration of renewables thus requires not only
a strong and enforceable right to gain grid access but also a departure from the
presently prevailing "deep" connection charging regime.
Even where producers of renewable energy gain physical access to the
grid and electricity market, they will encounter considerable difficulties selling
their electricity in the wholesale electricity market. In order to ensure a stable
supply of electricity, power is usually traded in forward markets. In these
markets, generators typically offer to supply electricity to the system operator
for five-minute intervals on a day-ahead basis.100 The next day, when the
relevant five-minute window opens, the generator has to deliver the promised
amount of electricity. Otherwise, the generator must compensate the system
operator under their imbalance settlement for balancing services the latter uses
to cover for the generator's lack of performance under their contract. The cost
of these balancing services varies depending on the time horizon that needs to
be balanced-the so-called replacement reserve (called upon hours ahead) is
cheapest, with rates going up for the secondary reserve (called upon minutes
ahead) and peaking for the primary reserve (called upon seconds ahead).' 0
Many renewable energy technologies-such as those using solar or wind
power to generate electricity-cannot predict their output with sufficient
accuracy one day in advance. By the time their predictions become sufficiently
accurate, approximately four hours before production, most national and
international electricity transmissions have already been traded, and the
remaining liquidity in the intra-day market tends to be low. 102 By virtue of
their intermittency, producers relying on these renewable energy sources are
98. Accordingly, one commentator in discussing the shortcomings of a national RPS identified
siting and cost allocation as "significant barriers to renewable power development." Rossi, supra note 56
at 1428.
99. MENDONCA ET AL., supra note 75, at 31.
100. For an introduction to the architecture of the electricity market, see Corinna Klessmann et al.,
Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks: A Comparison of the Market
Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 3646, 3647 (2008).
101. Id. at 3648.
102. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 94.
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therefore at a considerable disadvantage when exposed to the balancing market
and its imbalance settlement mechanisms the same way as their fossil fuel
competitors. 103 There are good efficiency-related arguments to expose
renewables to the electricity market's forecast and balancing obligations in the
long run, especially once the market share of renewables has reached critical
mass and they have proven competitive. However, the objective--dictated by
the urgency of climate change-to quickly shift from fossil fuels to renewables
suggests that, for now, their risks and market responsibility be minimized. 104
C. Non-Marketplace Barriers to Entry
In addition to the market-related barriers to entry, renewables have to
overcome substantial obstacles that do not relate directly to the electricity
market and its peculiarities. Before producers of electricity from renewable
sources of energy can sell or produce electricity at all, they need to obtain all
the permits to build and operate their power plants. The timeframe and
complexity of the permit process vary considerably from one jurisdiction to
another, directly affecting the cost of generation. The longer the lead-time and
the greater the uncertainty of the permit process, the higher the cost of capital
as banks and other investors will charge a premium for their financial support.
The investment uncertainty and cost of capital directly influence the
deployment rate of renewables. For instance, France offers similar rates to
producers of electricity from wind power as Germany. Yet, as a result of the
complicated and lengthy French permitting process, which involves a multitude
of different administrative authorities, deployment of wind power plants in
France has been much slower than in neighboring Germany.105 The problem is
not one limited to France or Europe but hinders the deployment of renewables
in the United States as well. 106 Most of the difficulties that renewable energy
power plant developers face center around fragmented permit procedures,
discussed in Part II.C. 1, spatial planning issues, discussed in Part II.C.2, and
problems of acceptability among the local population, discussed in Part JI.C.3.
103. The U.K. electricity market provides a good example of the considerable financial risks the
balancing market can impose on intermittent renewables. For details, see Klessmann et al., supra note
100, at 3653. In the United States, the cost of balancing to compensate for the use of distributed
generation can reach up to $18.75 per kWh for stand-by service, driving up generation costs by as much
as 20 percent. See Ferrey, supra note 55, at 287.
104. See Klessmann et al., supra note 100, at 3659.
105. Finon, supra note 16, at 128.
106. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 17, at 775. For an overview of the complicated regulatory
framework applicable to wind energy projects, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY




1. Fragmented and Lengthy Permit Procedures
A high level of fragmentation greatly complicates and lengthens the
permit process in many jurisdictions. In the past, large-scale power plant
projects have traditionally been backed by strong government support,
especially where they were run by government-owned utilities companies. 107
Even in today's liberalized electricity markets, large-scale power plants often
receive preferential treatment in the form of a single, comprehensive permit
process.108 Small-scale power plants, in turn, seldom benefit from such
streamlined processes but, rather, require multiple parallel permit
procedures.1 09
The appeal of many renewables technologies, such as solar photovoltaic,
biofuel, or wind energy, lies partly in their suitability for micro-generation
through decentralized, non-clustered and relatively small-scale projects. They
not only have the potential to incur fewer distribution costs and transmission
losses than many larger, centralized plants, but also to increase energy security
through greater grid resiliency.110 Yet, it is difficult to exploit this potential if
the complicated and fragmented permit process takes several years to
complete.111 Wind turbine projects in the United States, for instance, have to
comply with federal as well as regionally varying state and local regulations. At
the federal level alone, acquiring the necessary permits for a wind power plant
may involve no fewer than eight different agencies.1 12 At the state and local
level, the situation is no better, as an October 2009 report of New Mexico's
Renewable Energy Transmission Authority recognizes. In its report, the
Authority recommends "the establishment of a well-coordinated multi-state
effort in the siting and permitting of transmission infrastructure" to avoid the
time-consuming "multiplicity" of the state and local permit processes.113
Even where the same permit requirements apply to renewable energy
plants and fossil fuel plants, the burden of multiple and often duplicative
administrative procedures tends to weigh much heavier on renewable energy
plants. Renewables plants usually have a several orders of magnitude lower
107. See, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's support for nuclear plants, How We
Regulate, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory.html.
108. See, for example, the California Energy Commission's one-stop permitting process for
thermal power plants with an output capacity of 50 MW or more. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, ENERGY
FACILITIES SITING/LICENSING PROCESS, http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2011).
109. For a striking example regarding biofuel plants in Germany, see Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 96.
110. The interplay of electricity from renewables, their potential for micro-generation, and energy
security is beyond the scope of this Article. For details, refer to CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDEN,
supra note 8, at 14.
111. In the Netherlands, for instance, the International Energy Agency reported permit procedures
for wind turbines of four to five years. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY: MARKET &
POLICY TRENDS IN LEA COUNTRIES 476 (2004).
112. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 106, at 120.
113. See Dennis & Davis, supra note 54, at 301.
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output capacity and, hence, a lower earning potential, on the plant level, than
their fossil fuel competitors. For instance, a residential solar photovoltaic
rooftop installation rarely has a nameplate capacity of more than 10 kilowatts
(kW).114 In 2010, the world's largest installed wind turbine boasted a
nameplate capacity of 6,000 kW."II In contrast, the nameplate capacity of U.S.
coal plants ranges from around 3,000 kW to more than 2,000,000 kW." 6 These
output differences are even more pronounced when accounting for the fact that
the intermittency of solar and wind powered plants prevent them from
operating at full capacity for most of the day. In relation to their considerably
lower power output and earning potential, renewables plants frequently require
considerably more time and money at the permit stage than large-scale fossil
fuel plants.
2. Spatial Planning
One key factor determining the likelihood of success of any permit
application is spatial planning. Traditionally, spatial planning takes the form of
zoning, which reserves specific zones for industrial development, including
power plants. With the arrival of renewable energy plants, many local land use
plans require revision to include specific zoning regulation for wind, solar,
biofuel and other renewable energy plants. Without adjustments, local zoning
regimes would likely treat micro-generation plants that use renewables the
same as a large-scale nuclear power plant. The necessary modifications,
however, take time and create considerable and ultimately costly uncertainty
for project developers.11 7 A prominent example features the city of Belle
Meade in Tennessee, where local zoning regulation initially prevented climate
change combatant Al Gore from installing solar panels on his roof.'18 A 2005
national survey among local planners conducted by the American Planning
Association and the Environmental and Energy Study Institute proves Mr.
Gore's difficulties to be illustrative of U.S. spatial planning's lack of attention
to renewables. 119 In fact, more than 80 percent of the surveyed communities
did not even address renewable energy technologies in their zoning
ordinances. 120
114. MACKAY, supra note 23, at 38.
115. See Justin Thomas, New Record: World's Largest Wind Turbine (7+ Megawatts),
METAEFFICIENT (Feb. 3, 2008), http://www.metaefficient.com/news/new-record-worlds-largest-wind-
turbine-7-megawatts.html.
116. See Existing US. Coal Plants, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=
Existing U.S. CoalPlants (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
117. CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDtN, supra note 8, at 35; Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 96.
118. George Homsy, Earth, Wind, and Fire, 73 PLANNING 8, 46 (2007).
119. MEGAN LEWIS ET AL., THE ROLE OF PLANNING IN THE NEW ENERGY ERA, PLANNING




Many local authorities, while generally supportive of a low-carbon
economy based on renewables, are reluctant to open their communities to the
siting of wind turbines and other renewables plants of disputed aesthetic
value.121 This "not-in-my-backyard" movement has already gained strong
support in the United States, as evidenced by the recent opposition to wind
power projects in Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the Nantucket Sound.122
3. Local Acceptability
Spatial planning provides an illustrative example of the need to balance
local considerations with wider national and global concerns.123 Even if
innovative efforts and adjustments to the electricity market structure allow
renewables to become economically competitive with fossil fuels, local
opposition may still hinder the widespread deployment of renewable energy
plants. Local population, industry, and administration require time to learn how
to adjust to new technology.124 In the meantime, renewable energy
technologies struggle to overcome educational and behavioral barriers to their
market entry. For instance, concerns over the avian death toll continue to rank
high among the most common reservations against the construction of wind
turbines. 125 Yet, studies have shown that cellular communication towers are
responsible for more than one hundred times as many bird deaths as wind
turbines. 126 Cellular communication towers, too, once struggled to gain public
acceptance and have since become a perfectly integrated part of modem life.
There is good reason to believe that wind turbines and other renewables
plants will eventually follow cellular communication towers and other
technological landmarks to become integral parts of our daily lives. For the
time being, however, public acceptance of renewables comes at a price, as a
recent example from Germany illustrates: in order to gain the local authorities'
approval for their solar photovoltaic plant, project developers offered to move
the tax-relevant seat of the corporation running the plant onsite, thus ensuring
121. During his time in private practice, the author learned that some local zoning authorities in
Germany, for instance, attempt to prevent the construction of wind turbines by locating zones for their
construction only in the most wind-sheltered parts of their jurisdiction.
122. For details on local zoning efforts against wind development in Wyoming, the protracted
conflict over wind power projects in the Nantucket Sound, and debates over the aesthetics of ridgeline
wind projects in Vermont, see Duane, supra note 17, at 775. After legislators estimated that over
600 MW of proposed wind projects had been stalled by local permit requirements, Wisconsin recently
enacted new statewide siting standards for larger wind projects; the currently suspended standards would
allow local control only so long as it is not more restrictive than the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission standards. See Dennis & Davis, supra note 54, at 300; see also Michaels, supra note 22,
at 98.
123. STERN, supra note 16, at 369.
124. Neuhoff, supra note 33, at 97.
125. Duane, supra note 17, at 776. For a further discussion of reported nuisances, see Mortenson,
supra note 75, at 189.
126. Additionally, domestic cats in the United States are responsible for more than 1,000 times as
many avian deaths as wind turbines. Jacobson, supra note 21, at 165.
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that the corporation's taxes would benefit the local community.127 That such a
deal had to be negotiated to overcome local opposition in a country widely
famed for its public policy support of renewables demonstrates the magnitude
of the problem of public and local acceptance of renewable energy. Finally, the
controversy over plant siting is exacerbated by the often corollary debates over
the transmission projects necessary to connect new renewables plants to the
grid.128
D. Summary
Market pull alone is not strong enough to drive the electricity sector's
transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy. The multitude of
barriers to innovation as well as marketplace and non-marketplace barriers to
renewables' entry into the electricity market provide powerful safeguards in
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FIGURE 2. SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
127. See Untemehmer Krinner, Bayerns ungekrnter Sonnenkbnig, SPIEGELONLINE (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0, 1518,706125,00.html.
128. One example is the controversy over the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zones project
that aims for a transmission-line build-out that would support the shipment of wind power from the site
of generation in West Texas to cities in Central and East Texas. See Kate Galbraith, Series Explores




III. WHY EMISSION PRICING ALONE WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM
There is widespread consensus among economists that putting a price on
emissions-for example, by means of a carbonl 29 tax or cap-and-trade
regime-is in theory the single most efficient policy to mitigate climate
change. 130 In fact, economic theory suggests that pricing emissions provides
the most efficient incentives for the development and dissemination of lower-
emission technologies, such as renewable energy technology. 13 1 By
internalizing the cost of emissions, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime
penalizes pollution and thus encourages abatement. This direct, static effect of
emission pricing is complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect of
encouraging efforts to improve existing abatement technologies.1 32
In terms of efficiency, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme would incur
fewer opportunity costs than policies designed to mitigate climate change
through the direct promotion of low-carbon technologies, including renewables.
Public funding for innovative efforts and the number of available experts are
limited. To commit resources to the promotion of renewable energy
technologies, therefore, incurs the opportunity cost of their lack of availability
to foster technological advances in other fields. While environmental policies
putting a price on emissions aim to correct a market failure-in other words, an
existing distortion in the economy-technological policies promoting
renewables create a new distortion of the energy market. In addition, the
transaction costs caused by a carbon tax are likely to be lower than those
generated by the administration of a technology policy that actively supports
renewables.133
The many arguments that, in theory, weigh in favor of a carbon tax or cap-
and-trade regime stand in stark contrast to recent experience, including the
failures of the 2009 Copenhagen and 2010 Canciin Climate Conferences. In
practice, emission pricing appears unlikely to be the panacea driving the
transition to renewable sources of energy. The political realities, discussed in
Part III.A, as well as conceptual difficulties, discussed in Part III.B, of carbon
tax and cap-and-trade schemes represent significant obstacles to their
successful implementation. The practical example of the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), discussed in Part III.C, illustrates how, despite these
129. While carbon dioxide is only one of many greenhouse gases--others include methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride-it is the most prominent in the
electricity sector and, hence, the focus of this Article and its terminology. See WHAT ARE GREENHOUSE
GASES?, NATIONAL ENERGY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/
chapterl.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011)
130. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 16, at 35, 348; Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 165, 169; Finon,
supra note 16, at 112; Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 140.
131. Fischer & Newell, supra note 16, at 143.
132. Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 137 (discussing technological change induced by
environmental policies).
133. Id. at 140.
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political and conceptual challenges, emission pricing can contribute to the
renewables revolution. However, even assuming proper design and successful
implementation, an emission pricing policy would fail to address many of the
previously identified obstacles to the large-scale deployment of renewables, as
will be shown in Part III.D.
A. Political Realities
Due to their economic implications, emission pricing policies hold little
political appeal outside of a multilateral or global initiative. Even the most
environmentally concerned policymakers are reluctant to implement a carbon
tax or cap-and-trade regime that could jeopardize the economic wellbeing of
their constituencies and, subsequently, their own political future. And, where
policymakers can muster the necessary courage to risk their political career in
favor of the environment, they tend to encounter fierce opposition from
affected industries. 134 The 2009 Copenhagen and 2010 Cancun Climate
Conferences' failures to reach a binding international agreement for the post-
Kyotol 35 era are but two, albeit very prominent, examples of how policy
makers across the globe continue to put economic interests before
environmental concerns.136 Closer to home, the U.S. Senate's failure to enact
comprehensive climate and energy legislation,137 including a carbon pricing
scheme, provides further evidence of the forces at play.138 Such a lag in policy
134. The history of Japan's industry evading a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme by committing to a
voluntary, rather half-hearted emissions trading scheme is an illustrative example of such industry
opposition. In fact, the climate change mitigation measures proposed by the Ministry of the Environment
met with considerable opposition from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. See Schatz, supra
note 17, at 615, 617.
135. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
adopted in 1997-in force since 2005, but never ratified by the United States-includes greenhouse gas
emission reduction targets for thirty-seven countries and the European Economic Community of 5
percent compared to 1990 emissions from 2008 to 2012. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, available at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto protocol/items/2830.php.
136. See Tobias Rapp et al., How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit,
SPIEGELONLINE (May 5, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/0,1518,692861,00.html
(reporting the decisive meetings over the proposal for mandatory climate change mitigation goals).
137. For a summary of the Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill, passed by the House of
Representatives but not by the U.S. Senate, see H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl1l-2454&tab=summary (last
visited Dec.. 15, 2011). Following the Republican victory in the November 2010 elections, Democratic
Senator Harry Reid declared federal cap-and-trade legislation dead. See Smith, supra note 27.
138. Some commentators have recently gone as far as calling "naive" the assumption that emission
pricing in the United States were politically achievable and would drive innovation. See John A. Alic et
al., A New Strategy for Energy Innovation, 466 NATURE 316, 317 (2010). More encouraging, albeit
relatively weak pricing signals come from regional initiatives, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, see infra Part III.C, or the Western Climate Initiative formed by seven western U.S. states
(Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) and four Canadian
provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Qudbec). The Western Climate Initiative published
design recommendations for its own cap-and-trade program in September of 2008. See The WCI Cap &
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progress stands in stark contrast to the widespread awareness and concern
regarding climate change among Americans. 139 In defense of policy makers,
however, it should be noted that emission pricing would indeed have serious
economic implications, affecting economic activity, international
competitiveness, and distributional fairness.
A carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime designed to internalize the full
environmental cost of emissions would likely bring with it a significant
reduction in the overall economic activity of those affected. Regardless of
whether producers or consumers of energy are the immediate addressees of
such a policy, it would inevitably drive up the cost of energy to consumers. As
a result, especially energy-intensive sectors of the economy, such as the
metallurgical industry, would face severe difficulties in continuing to operate at
a profit, and would likely consider relocation to a different jurisdiction where
electricity is cheaper. 140 The effort to create new employment opportunities by
promoting renewable energies through emission pricing would thus come at the
expense of leakage that leads to reduced employment opportunities in other
industries. Basically, green jobs might be created at the expense of blue collar
jobs.
The increase in production costs that results from higher energy prices
would reduce the affected industry's international competitiveness. Unless
emission pricing policies are implemented at a global or, at least, a multilateral
scale, industries that are subject to a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regulation will
find themselves at a considerable disadvantage as they compete with industries
from jurisdictions that do not internalize the environmental cost of emissions.
Even the imposition of protective tariffs on products from countries without
emission pricing is a remedy that promises partial success, at best. Many
developed countries have transferred their tariff and customs authority to
supranational institutions, as is the case with the member states of the European
Union. More importantly, such tariffs would ensure the burdened industry's
Trade Program, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-
trade-program (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). In the absence of a regional consensus, California and
Qu6bec have begun to implement their own state cap-and-trade legislation. See Cap and Trade 2010,
CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capandtradel0.htm;
http://www.montrealgazette.
com/technology/Quebec+trade+follows+Kyoto+reversal/5869801/story.html (last visited Dec. 23,
2011).
139. According to ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET Al., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS' GLOBAL WARMING BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES IN MAY
2011 4 (2009), available at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateBeliefsMay20l l.pdf, over
50 percent of Americans are "somewhat or very worried" about global warming. To date, however,
awareness is rarely matched by corresponding policy implementation. See MEDEARIS, supra note 5,
at 13.
140. A good example of such leakage resulting from high electricity prices for energy-intensive
industries is the relocation of a Spanish steel plant to Poland in response to increased energy costs. See
RAQUEL MERINO JARA ET AL., STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC AID TO




competitiveness only in its home market, but not in the global export market,
where every country or supranational entity makes its own tariff choices.
Finally, the surge in energy prices resulting from a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade regime would have visible distributional effects likely to meet local
resistance. 141 As mentioned above, many countries across the globe have a
long-standing policy of subsidizing the energy sector in order to keep energy
affordable to low-income households. Policymakers breaking with this tradition
will likely incur the wrath of their constituents and may face removal from
office in the next election. The public good nature of the environmental
benefits that emission pricing aims to purport will further undermine local
acceptance: those subjected to higher energy rates as a result of emission
pricing will resent that their geographic neighbors, who maintain a polluting
energy sector, get a free ride. Worse yet, at least from a global perspective, is
the general damage a drastic increase in energy prices could cause to the public
support for climate change mitigation.142
B. Conceptual Difficulties
Even if policy makers were to overcome the high hurdles political reality
has placed on the path to a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime, they would still
face the numerous conceptual difficulties associated with emission pricing.
These difficulties range from uncertainties on the cost of climate change over
credibility issues to the risk of replacing one path dependency with another.
The first and probably greatest challenge to the implementation of a
carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime is to attach the right price tag to emissions.
A price set too high may provide stronger incentives for a transition to
renewable sources of energy but would reduce emissions-related economic
activity below the socially optimal level. The politically more probable
scenario of a price set too low would fail to fully internalize the environmental
cost of emissions, providing only weak incentives for a shift to renewables. 143
The great difficulty in estimating the optimal carbon tax or cap-and-trade
emissions allowance stems from the considerable uncertainties surrounding the
current and future cost of climate change; estimates in peer-reviewed studies
range from -$3 to $95 per ton of carbon dioxide.' The vast and unpredictable
systemic effects of emissions-induced climate change and the long timeframe
141. Finon, supra note 16, at 112.
142. Remarkably, the same constituents that oppose a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime tend to
support policies that instead tackle climate change through the active promotion of renewable energy
technologies, even though the constituents still pick up the bill through taxes or, again, through
increased energy prices passed on to consumers by the utilities.
143. Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 140.
144. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 69.
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of their manifestation make it virtually impossible to determine the appropriate
price to fully internalize the cost of emissions. 145
The long timeframe of climate change and its mitigation brings with it
another substantial challenge to a successful emission pricing regime. In light
of the aforementioned political realities, no emission pricing policy will be
endowed with total credibility decades into the future. 146 Yet, in order to
leverage investment in renewable energy and other abatement technologies, a
carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime requires sufficient credibility to induce
investors' faith in its durability.147 Emission pricing is still in its infancy and
even the more daring pioneer projects are wrought with exemptionsl 48 or
characterized by relatively short timeframes, such as the European Union's
Emissions Trading Scheme. 149 The cautious, somewhat half-hearted nature of
the few existing policy attempts at emission pricing exacerbates the general
uncertainties of investment in technological innovation and the particular issues
outlined above that relate to innovation in renewable energy technologies. 150
C. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative -A Practical Example
The Northeast's RGG1151 provides a good practical example that
demonstrates what emission pricing can and cannot contribute to climate
change mitigation in the present political and economic environment. RGGI's
goal is to stabilize and then reduce the electricity generation sector's carbon
145. See Jaffe et al., supra note 16, at 165 (speaking of the "seeming intractability" of climate
change).
146. See STERN, supra note 16, at 36.
147. Id. at 36, 352; Fischer & Newell, supra note 16, at 143.
148. Sweden's eco-tax on energy, for instance, does not apply to many industrial consumers of
energy. SWEDEN: ENERGY, CARBON AND SULPHUR DIOXIDE TAXATION, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode-re&id=43&action=detail (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
149. See Finon, supra note 16, at 112. The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme aims to
lower the overall cost of its member states' aggregated emissions reduction obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol by means of emissions trade among members. For the possibility of California's participation
in the E.U.'s Emissions Trading Scheme, see Duane, supra note 17, at 722. For an overview of the
Emissions Trading Scheme's "growing pains," see Schatz, supra note 17, at 608.
150. Admittedly, issues of uncertainty and credibility can also affect support regimes that, rather
than the "stick" of emission pricing, employ the "carrot" of direct subsidies. However, many
constitutions recognize the protection of legitimate expectations, rewarding reliance on existing support
programs, and holding policymakers to a high standard when trying to prematurely end policy support.
Such constitutional safeguards rarely extend to reliance upon regimes employing "sticks" such as
emission pricing. See Matthias Lang, BVerfG: Injunction Against Solar Feed-in Tariff Reduction
Denied, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=4166 (discussing
the German Constitutional Court's reasoning in its decision regarding the cut in the national support
program for solar PV).
151. RGGI originates from an invitation of New York's Governor George Pataki to his fellow
Northeast governors for concerted action against climate change. For details regarding the political
process that eventually gave birth to RGGI, see Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1959 (2007).
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dioxide emissions. 152 To this end, the Initiative's member states--Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont-have introduced a common multi-
state cap for emissions from the power generation sector. 153 By virtue of their
respective state legislation, the member states require local electricity
generators to hold allowances equal to their carbon dioxide emissions over a
three-year control period.154 RGGI initially auctions off the corresponding
carbon dioxide allowances, and power generators can subsequently trade these
allowances. The proceeds from allowance auctions shall be used to support
low-carbon intensity solutions, including energy efficiency and renewable
energy technologies, such as solar and wind power. 155
Since 2008, RGGI has held fourteen auctions over an aggregate of 393
million tons of carbon dioxide emissions, raising a total of $952 million in
revenue.156 Over the course of all auctions, the clearing price ranged from
$1.86 to $3.51 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions allowance. As of late,
auctions have cleared at or minimally above the reserve price of $1.86, turning
RGGI into a carbon tax rather than a cap-and-trade scheme. Even at the higher
price, the clearing price falls far short of fully internalizing the environmental
cost of carbon dioxide emissions based on current estimates. 157 As a
consequence, RGGI sends a relatively weak price signal to producers of
electricity from fossil fuel sources. The low price will hardly convince
generators to invest in renewable energy technologies that, even accounting for
the cost of carbon dioxide emission allowances, incur considerably higher
electricity production costs than current, polluting technologies. Conversely,
the resulting increase in electricity rates is unlikely to bring about significant
changes in consumer behavior. Overall, at its present quota, RGGI's cap-and-
152. See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited Dec. 15,
2011).
153. See Documents, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/states (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011). In addition to its member states, RGGI includes the state of Pennsylvania and the
Canadian Provinces of New Brunswick, Ontario, and Qudbec as observers. See
http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou. A recent vote by the New Hampshire House of Representatives
to leave RGGI and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie's announcement to do the same illustrate the
substantial difficulties in obtaining and maintaining a political consensus for emission pricing. See
Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey from 10-State Climate Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011,
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-greenhouse-
gas-coalition.html? r- 1 &pagewanted=print.
154. To guide its member states and ensure uniform implementation of the new regime, RGGI
developed a model rule. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE: PART XX CO 2 BUDGET
TRADING PROGRAM, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%2ORevised%2012.31.08.pdf.
155. See RGGI, Inc., REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/rggi. (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
156. For further details, including a state-by-state breakdown of the cumulative auction proceeds,
see Auction Results, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/
results (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
157. See the range of carbon dioxide emissions prices discussed supra Part III.B.
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trade system cannot be expected to serve as a strong regulatory driver of the
necessary timely transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy.
The relatively weak regulatory and incentive effects of RGGI's cap-and-
trade scheme are no coincidence. They are not the result of overestimating the
total amount of carbon dioxide emissions from its member states' electricity
production and a subsequent drop in allowance clearing prices, as evidenced in
the early stages of the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme.158 Rather,
they represent a deliberate tribute to the political realities and conceptual
difficulties of emission pricing outlined above. RGGI expressly justifies its
moderate approach with the aims of "providing predictable market signals and
regulatory certainty" and avoiding "dramatic electricity price impacts."159
According to one of the program's key designers, RGGI is intended not so
much as a cap-and-trade but as a cap-and-invest scheme that raises funds for
public support of low-carbon measures. 160 With per-state cumulative proceeds
from allowance auctions currently ranging from $7 million (Vermont) to $345
million (New York), RGGI has certainly proved an effective fundraising
instrument. 161 Until the political realities and conceptual difficulties of
emission pricing have been resolved, a moderately priced, fundraising-oriented
approach following RGGI's example appears to be the best, if not the only
viable use of carbon taxes or cap-and-trade schemes. In addition to raising
funds for low-carbon projects, it allows policymakers to gather further
experience with the emissions monitoring process and, when designed as a cap-
and-invest scheme, refine the mechanisms of market-based emission pricing. 162
D. Emission Pricing Utopia-A Thought Experiment
The example of RGGI illustrates that emission pricing has an important
part to play in the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based electricity
158. When the news spread that the ETS had allocated at least 3 percent more carbon dioxide
allowances than verified emissions for the first trading period, the market price plummeted from C30 to
E12 per ton of carbon dioxide. See Schatz, supra note 17, at 608; Duane, supra note 17, at 722.
159. See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://icapandtrade.com/index.php?option=com
content&view-article&id=9:regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-rggi&catid=3:reporting-tools&Itemid=5
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011). Similarly, California's recently passed cap-and-trade legislation provides for
the distribution of allowances through a combination of free allocation and sale at auction, with a
gradual reduction of freely allocated allowances. See CAL. AIR REs. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM:
UPDATED INFORMATIVE DIGEST (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/
capandtradel 0/finuid.pdf
160. See Duane, supra note 17, at 734 (reporting an interview with Richard Cowart who explains
the option of a revenue-neutral cap-and-dividend scheme).
161. For an overview, see Auction Results, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 156.
To date, most of the proceeds have been used to fund improvements in energy efficiency rather than
renewable energy technologies. See News Releases, REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
http://www.rggi.org/news/releases (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
162. In practice, however, policy makers should be able to draw on their experiences with the cap-
and-trade system established for sulfur dioxide emissions under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act that reduced acid rain by 50 percent. See Lunt, supra note 17, at 385, 406.
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sector. Nonetheless, even if endowed with sufficient credibility and at a price
level reflecting the true cost of emissions-that is, orders of magnitude higher
than under RGGI-emission pricing alone will not be sufficient to drive the
timely transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based electricity sector. To
illustrate, I will now proceed to assume that the discussed political realities and
conceptual difficulties have been overcome and an emission pricing regime has
been adopted that provides for the full internalization of the cost of emissions
with perfect long-term credibility. This thought experiment allows me to
discuss the potential, limitations, and shortcomings of an appropriate and
credible price on emissions. To this end, I will evaluate the policy impact of our
Utopian emission pricing regime on each of the previously identified
impediments to innovation and barriers to entry.
1. Policy Impact on Impediments to Innovation
In terms of innovation, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime incentivizes
investment in R&D to advance renewable energy technologies. Assuming the
necessary credibility, such a regime would promise sufficiently high rates of
return to encourage outside investment, thus eliminating the present dearth of
outside capital for R&D related to renewables. At the same time, the resultant
higher cost of service may induce electric utilities to explore efficiency gains
through renewables, bringing about a higher R&D intensity within the energy
sector. However, such efforts may still be limited if the rate-base calculation by
the responsible utilities commissions fails to include R&D expenditures. In
addition, emission pricing resolves only the issue of environmental externalities
but not that of knowledge and learning externalities, which may still keep the
overall innovative efforts below the socially optimal level.
2. Policy Impact on Marketplace Barriers to Entry
With regard to the market-related barriers to entry, emission pricing will
undoubtedly help renewables become cost-competitive with fossil fuels much
sooner than the presently prevailing regime that allows externalization of
environmental costs. The magnitude of this effect, however, will depend on the
extent to which existing subsidies for fossil fuels continue to tilt the playing
field in their favor. The status quo of allowing the externalization of
environmental costs incurred through fossil fuel electricity generation is but
one of many direct and indirect subsidies in favor of fossil fuels. Moreover,
emission pricing does not resolve the existing issues related to renewables'
market access in terms of connection to the grid as well as integration into the
wholesale market, with its day-ahead trading and balancing responsibilities.
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3. Policy Impact on Non-Marketplace Barriers to Entry
Most significantly, emission pricing would do nothing to help renewables
overcome barriers to entry that do not relate to the marketplace and its
structure. Thus, the "not-in-my-backyard" attitude of many communities and
other issues of local opposition would continue to hinder construction of wind
turbines and other power plants that rely on renewable sources of energy.
Worse yet, lengthy and fragmented permit processes would impose
considerable transaction costs on renewables projects, thereby canceling out
part of the cost-competitiveness that emission pricing aims to create in favor of
renewable sources of energy.
4. The Problem of Path Dependency
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of emission pricing policies is their
inability to resolve or at least mitigate the risk of replacing one path
dependency with another. Rather, the ensuing market pull toward renewables
would raise new concerns. It would likely trigger a run for the current least-cost
renewable energy technologies, such as hydroelectric and onshore wind, both
of which boast substantial potential for future exploitation.1 63 However, as the
market's invisible hand grasps for the least-cost short-term solutions, it may
well ignore technologies that could prove more cost-efficient in the long
term. 164 As a result, the present technology lock-in in favor of fossil fuels
would make room for one favoring a select few renewable energy technologies
that happen to be the most cost-competitive at the start of emission pricing.
Replacing one path dependency with another, albeit one based on renewables,
is a risky undertaking at best. First, the magnitude of the required
transformation from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy is such that a
whole cluster of renewable energy technologies is needed to achieve it.165
Second, a narrow focus on no more than a few technologies may well drive up
the cost of current least-cost candidates in the long term as necessary resources,
such as sites for hydroelectric and wind projects, grow scarce. Already, some of
the pioneering nations in renewables policies see themselves forced to
implement legislation requiring minimum standards, such as for insolation or
wind speeds, so as to ensure efficient siting of renewables plants. In recognition
that suitable sites are limited, these nations incentivize replacement of older
163. For an overview of the future potential of renewable energy technologies, see INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY, supra note 19, at 64.
164. STERN, supra note 16, at 358.
165. Jacobsson et al., supra note 36, at 2144; see also Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to
Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENvTL. L. 715, 730 (1995) (warning that the
window of opportunity to modernize and diversify our power generation technology portfolio is
relatively narrow). Once in place, new generation technology-diversified or not-is likely to be used
for decades to come. Id.
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plants with more efficient modem equipment. 166 Finally, only a diversified
portfolio of renewable energy technologies provides increased energy
security. 167
5. Summary
In economic terms, even a Utopian emission pricing regime would directly
address but two of the market failures and peculiarities that hinder the rise of
renewables-the environmental externalities and the resulting lack of product
differentiation. Additionally, such a regime can be expected to have a weaker,
more indirect favorable impact on impediments to innovation of renewables,
such as the dearth of outside funding and electricity rate regulation.
Furthermore, it would help compensate to some extent for the numerous direct
and indirect subsidies that presently favor fossil fuels. These positive policy
impacts notwithstanding, the remaining impediments to innovation and barriers
to entry of renewables represent powerful forces in defense of the deeply
entrenched fossil fuel energy incumbents. Emission pricing offers no solution
to barriers related to the electricity market's structure or any of the non-
marketplace barriers to entry. Finally, emission pricing would greatly augment
the risk of replacing our current path dependency on fossil fuels with one that
focuses on a select few renewable energy technologies that happened to be
most cost-competitive at the start of pricing emissions. Figure 3 summarizes
these findings.
166. See, e.g., REPLACEMENT SCHEME FOR WIND TURBINES ON LAND, http://www.ens.dk/en-
US/supply/Renewable-energy/WindPower/Onshore-Wind-Power/Replacement-scheme-for-wind-
turbines-on-land/Sider/Forside.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (Denmark's 2004 Replacement Scheme
for Wind Turbines on Land); 2009 AMENDMENT OF GERMANY'S RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ACT,
http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re&id=4054&action=detail (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
167. CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDEN, supra note 8, at 14.
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FIGURE 3. POLICY IMPACT OF EMISSION PRICING ON IMPEDIMENTS TO
INNOVATION AND BARRIERS To ENTRY
In light of the many unresolved obstacles to th re cdeployment of
renewables, even a strong emission pricmg regime may not level the playing
field between fossil fuels and renewable sources of energy. A high price on
emissions will undoubtedly help renewables become competitive in terms of
production costs, excluding regulatory expenses. However, after factoring in
these regulatory expenses-for example, for permit procedures, grid
connection, forecast obligations, and balancing responsibilities-renewables
are still likely to struggle with their overall cost-competitiveness.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S. RENEWABLES POLICY
As the previous section illustrates, emission pricing offers at best a partial
remedy to the multitude of obstacles that bar the way to a timely transition from
fossil fuels to renewables. It is extremely doubtful that emission pricing alone
will fuel the rise of renewable energy in the United States at the rate necessary
to successfully mitigate climate change, or to place well in the race to
renewables.168 Hence, it is imperative to consider further policy design options.
168. See discussion supra Part I.
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Support for the deployment of renewables across the globe presently
manifests itself in four general policy approaches.1 69 Feed-in tariffs offer
producers of electricity from renewable sources subsidized rates for power sold
to the grid.170 Through tender schemes, regulators invite bids from the private
sector for contracts, which set out the overall amount of energy, its source, and
other criteria, for the supply of electricity from renewables to the grid.171 Tax
credits reward the investment in renewable power plants (Investment Tax
Credit) or the production of electricity from renewables (Production Tax
Credit).172 Finally, mandatory Renewable Portfolio Standards coupled with
Renewable Energy Certificates allow power producers that harness renewables
to sell their electricity and the corresponding green certificates so as to earn
more than the market rate for electricity alone. 173
This Article does not purport to validate or endorse any of these four
policy streams.174 Instead, following a bottom-up approach based on the
previously identified obstacles, I aim to point out key elements crucial to the
success of any policy in facilitating a timely transition to renewables. Rather
than reinvent the wheel, I will, where possible, draw on the policy experiences
of others. A rich array of policies in support of renewable energy has already
been developed and implemented in various nations around the world that face
the same obstacles as the United States in their efforts to ramp up
renewables. 175 While some countries have achieved little success, others have
managed to encourage considerable deployment and, in the process, created a
strong domestic renewable energy industry.176 Successful climate change
mitigation and preservation of U.S. leadership in technological innovation
require that Washington act quickly and effectively to make up for the missed
169. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 19, at 92.
170. The first to establish feed-in tariffs were Portugal (1988), Germany (1990), Denmark (1992),
and Spain (1994). See MENDONCA ET AL., supra note 75, at 77.
171. Id. at 174. The international advocates of tender schemes include the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Canada, and China. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 19, at 92, 94, 95.
172. MENDONQA ET AL., supra note 75, at 170, 172. Under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, producers of electricity from renewables
may claim either Investment Tax Credits or Production Tax Credits.
173.. Early adopters of Renewable Energy Certificate trading regimes include Belgium (Flanders),
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Anna Bergek & Staffan Jacobsson, Are Tradable Green
Certificates a Cost-Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent-Generating Machine? Lessons
from Sweden 2003-2008, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 1255, 1256 (2010).
174. For a detailed qualitative comparison of these policy approaches, see Felix Mormann,
Enhancing the Investor Appeal ofRenewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. (2012 forthcoming).
175. For a concise overview of the state of policy implementation across the member countries of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) nations, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 19, at 94.
176. The textbook example is Denmark's wind turbine manufacturer Vestas, leading the world
market with a share of 12.5 percent in 2009 despite a relatively small domestic market. See Braden




opportunities of the past.' 77 The United States cannot afford to go through the
same lengthy policy learning process the pioneering nations in renewables
embarked on some twenty years ago. Fortunately, there is plenty to be learned
from other countries' policy experience with renewable energy in order to
avoid their failures and replicate their successes.
The search for the best policy design options to facilitate a timely
transition to renewables should not, however, be limited to a purely
international perspective. The frequent comparisons between today's
renewables challenge and the 1960s Space Race point to the hallmarks of U.S.
technology policy in other sectors. 178 The quest for policy options that
effectively promote renewable energy must include a cross-sectorial
perspective, so as to draw on the vast experience of domestic technology policy
in sectors such as defense or information technology. Finally, the American
energy sector's very own history with renewables demands close consideration
in order to learn from the successes and failures of the past.
In line with the nomenclature and structure of this Article, the following
discussion of policy design recommendations for the promotion of renewables
will once more distinguish between impediments to innovation, discussed in
Part IV.A, marketplace-related barriers to entry, discussed in Part IV.B, and
barriers that do not relate directly to the marketplace, discussed in Part IV.C.
A. Policy Suggestions to Overcome Impediments to Innovation
The list of impediments to innovation in renewables is headed by spillover
effects related to environmental and knowledge externalities, which I address in
Part IV.A.1. Another restraining force, especially on the industry's innovative
efforts, is the high-risk, high-stakes character of energy innovation, as
discussed in Part IV.A.2. Most importantly, innovation of the magnitude
necessary for successful transformation of the energy sector requires substantial
public funding, which I explore in Part IV.A.3. To yield the desired innovative
success in the short and long term, such funding must be integrated in a
sustained innovation infrastructure, that I propose in Part IV.A.4.
1. Resolution of Environmental and Knowledge Externalities
As discussed earlier, emission pricing can reduce if not eliminate the
environmental externalities that presently keep renewables innovation below
the socially optimal level.1 79 The resulting price-relevance of renewable
energy's environmental benefits leads to greater financial incentives for
renewables innovation. Issues related to knowledge spillover, however, remain.
177. See, for example, the history of inconsistent policy support for wind energy in the United
States, discussed supra note 75.
178. Recently, President Obama described the nation's renewables challenge as "our generation's
Sputnik moment." Obama, supra note 12.
179. See supra Part III.D.
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The literature on the socially optimal level of intellectual property protection
fills entire libraries; its discussion is well beyond the scope of this Article. 180
Whatever the strength of intellectual property rights, it is crucial that they be
available to renewables entrepreneurs, such as through licensing. In this
context, the technology transfer offices of universities and other research
institutions play a key role. The better these offices cooperate with industry, the
smaller the gap between an idea and its commercialization becomes. Already,
some universities have ramped up their technology transfer offices' staffing and
licensing capacity to meet the challenges and reap the benefits of
commercializing their innovations.18 1
2. Risk Leverage Through Public-Private Partnerships
Technology transfer offices are but one, albeit a very important, liaison
between the public and private sectors. Other branches of the economy have
shown the power of public-private partnerships to foster innovation. In 1987,
fourteen struggling U.S. semiconductor manufacturers joined forces with the
federal government to form the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
Association ("SEMATECH"). The consortium's goal was to resolve common
manufacturing issues by leveraging resources and thus sharing investment
risks. SEMATECH's industry members contributed financial resources and
personnel to improve areas such as fabrication, factory design and construction,
equipment performance, machine capabilities, and quality control. Government
assistance consisted of up to $100 million annually in matching funds for
industry member contributions to SEMATECH. 182 In 1996-less than a
decade after the consortium's inception-the U.S. semiconductor industry had
developed so successfully that SEMATECH's directors voted to end matching
federal funding for their innovative efforts and continue on their own.1 83
The dearth of outside funding and the traditionally low R&D intensity in
the energy sector are a tribute to the exceptionally high risks involved.
Following the semiconductor industry's glowing example, the U.S. government
should bear more of the risks involved in high-stakes, high-risk energy
innovation. Such risk leverage is not new to the American energy sector. In
fact, nuclear energy has long benefited from a risk transfer from shareholders to
180. For an economic view, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 124
(2008).
181. Located in the midst of Silicon Valley, Stanford University, for instance, features a technology
transfer office staffed with well over forty employees. See Who We Are, STANFORD UNIV., OFFICE OF
TECH. LICENSING, http://otl.stanford.edulaboutlaboutwho.html?headerbar-0 (last visited Dec. 15,
2011).
182. For further details on SEMATECH and an evaluation of its RD&D effects, see Douglas A.
Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, High-Tech R&D Subsidies Estimating the Effects of Sematech, 40 J. INT'L
ECON. 323, 325 (1996).
183. For history of SEMATECH's achievements, see SEMA TECH History, SEMATECH,
http://www.sematech.org/corporate/history.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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taxpayers, thanks to generous federal subsidies. 184 Other nations have already
opted for public-private partnerships to promote renewables. In 2007, for
instance, the United Kingdom founded the Energy Technologies Institute
bringing together the government and key players of the energy industry, such
as British Petroleum, Shell, or Rolls-Royce. The goal of their partnership is to
accelerate the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies so as to
meet the United Kingdom's energy targets and climate change obligations.' 8 5
A similar partnership in the United States could unite America's energy
incumbents, such as Exxon, Chevron, or ConocoPhillips, representatives of the
emerging renewables industry, and the government to join forces in the race to
renewables.
3. Substantial Increase in Innovation Funding
Innovation of the scale necessary for a timely transition to renewable
sources of energy is not just risky, it is costly, too. If the United States wants to
be a leader in renewables innovation and develop a strong domestic renewables
industry, government funding for research, development, and demonstration
(RD&D) must be increased substantially. Since 1997, numerous entities,
including the International Energy Agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, and the National Commission on Energy Policy have called for
substantial increases in federal spending on energy innovation. The spectrum of
suggested increases ranges from a mere doubling to a tenfold raise.186 In 2009,
more than thirty Nobel Laureates called on President Obama to support stable
energy innovation support at $15 billion per year. 187 In 2010, a group of
industry leaders, including Bill Gates, Chad Holliday, and Ursula Bums, urged
the U.S. government to raise its investment in clean energy innovation to $16
billion annually.188 For comparison, in 2008, total U.S. spending on R&D for
low-carbon energy technologies amounted to less than $2.5 billion. 189 This
disconcertingly low figure includes funding not only for renewable and other
sources of clean energy but also investment in energy efficiency as well as the
building and transport sector. In fact, renewables accounted for fewer than 20
percent of the 2008 budget for energy RD&D funding, which amounts to less
than $500 million. 190 Compared to its primary trading partners and
184. See John M. Broder, Obama's Bid to End Oil Subsidies Revives Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2011, at Al4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/science/earth/Olsubsidy.html.
185. For more information on the Energy Technologies Institute, see About Us, ENERGY TECH.
INST., http://www.eti.co.uk/index.php/about (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
186. For an overview, see AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 23.
187. Letter from Nobel Laureates to Barack Obama, President, United States (Jul. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/press/_docs/Nobelist%20Letter%20-%2007162009.pdf.
188. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 20.




competitors, such as Japan, Korea, France, and China, the United States spends
the smallest fraction of its gross domestic product on energy RD&D.191
In 2010, Great Britain announced its intention to invest up to $1.5 billion
to create the Green Investment Bank-a development bank that would address
market failures and investment barriers for low-carbon energy technologies.192
The British government expects the private sector to at least match its
commitment. Other nations, such as Canada, China, and Germany, have
already tapped the potential of development banks to promote the deployment
of renewables. 193 Since 2009, legislation providing for the establishment of a
similarly designed Clean Energy Deployment Administration has been pending
before Congress.1 94 If the examples set by other nations are not enough to
encourage a bipartisan effort in Washington, a look at America's own success
stories in innovation will hopefully do so.
For more than fifty years, federal funding for innovation in the health and
defense sectors has created substantial economic growth and jobs, ensuring
U.S. global leadership in related technologies. Such innovative success,
however, comes at a price. In 2008, the National Institute of Health (NIH)
received federal funding worth close to $30 billion. 195 This commitment
represents about 75 percent of worldwide spending in basic medical science.196
In the defense sector, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) has brought forth numerous revolutionary technologies, including
the technology and infrastructure that eventually gave birth to the Internet. 197
DARPA is part of a federal R&D funding commitment to the defense sector
that exceeded $55 billion in 2007.198
191. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 17.
192. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 58, at 13.
193. See Jake Caldwell & Richard W. Caperton, A New Clean Energy Deployment Administration,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jun. 16, 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/
06/ceda june 2010.html.
194. See Peter Behr, When Clean Energy Grants Run Out, Will a 'Green Bank' Take Over?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/05/10/10climatewire-when-clean-energy-
grants-run-out-will-a-gree-85696.html?pagewanted=1.
195. NAT'L SCI. BD., supra note 57, app. tbl.4-17.
196. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 22.
197. Id.
198. NAT'L SCI. BD., supra note 57, app. tbl. 4-17.
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FIGURE 4. FEDERAL R&D FUNDING FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, HEALTH,
AND ENERGY1 9 9
The newly created Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy
(ARPA-E) has the institutional potential to replicate DARPA's success.
Designed to pursue an entrepreneurial approach, ARPA-E focuses on "out-of-
the-box," transformational energy research that industry acting alone cannot or
will not support due to its high risk, but where resultant success would provide
dramatic benefits for the nation. 200 In addition, the Department of Energy has
launched its first three Energy Innovation Hubs. These hubs are intended to
advance highly promising areas of energy science and engineering from the
early stages of research to the point where the technology can be handed off to
the private sector.201
The institutional promise of ARPA-E and the Energy Innovation Hubs
will not be realized without adequate federal funding. At present, both
initiatives are grossly underfunded: ARPA-E's annual budget allocations
consisted of merely $300 million for 2008, stimulus funding of $400 million
for the two-year period of 2009 and 2010, and $300 million for 2011.202 This
199. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 25.
200. See About, ARPA-E, http://arpa-e.energy.gov/About/About.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
201. See ENERGY EFFICIENT BUILDING SYSTEMS HUB, http://energy.gov/hubs (last visited Nov. 27,
2011).
202. See the authorizing legislation for ARPA-E's funding (excerpt from H.R. 5116, Sec. 904
amending P.L. 110-69), U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ARPA-E, available at http://arpa-e.energy.gov/
LinkClick.aspxfileticket-5rEMQRwKDIk%3d&tabid=165 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). For ARPA-E's
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represents about 1 percent of NIH's annual funding and little more than 0.5
percent of DARPA's annual budget. As a result, in its first year of operation,
ARPA-E was able to support only thirty-seven of the 3,700 proposals received,
a mere 1 percent. 203 Similarly, the Energy Innovation Hubs receive only $25
million in federal funding annually. 204
To illustrate the gross inadequacy of federal funding for the challenge at
hand, it should be noted that the combined annual budgets of ARPA-E and the
Energy Innovation Hubs amount to less than one third of the U.S. daily oil
imports. 205 Granted, the growing budget deficit demands the overall reduction
of federal spending. It is questionable, however, whether cuts should include
funding for innovation in a field as crucial to America's environment,
economy, and security as the energy sector. Compared to many other nations,
the United States is already off to a late start into the race to renewables. The
innovative hallmarks of NIH and DARPA provide ample proof of the
American potential to assume leadership in key technologies. It is time to
unleash this potential in the challenge of a timely transition to renewables. To
do so, however, requires adequate funding. As painful as investment in energy
innovation may be in the present budget situation, it is inevitable if Washington
wants to avoid paying more later for future costs such as those related to
climate change adaptation. Moreover, today's investments will pay off in the
long run, once the required transformation of the energy sector is catalyzed
such that the private sector can take over.
4. Sustainable Innovation Infrastructure
Substantial public funding is a necessary, albeit not yet sufficient,
precondition for energy innovation. To be successful, such funding must be
accompanied by an infrastructure that guarantees sustainable innovation.
Especially in times of budget austerity measures, the efficient administration
and allocation of public funding must be ensured.
Based on the health and defense sectors' outstanding track record in
sustained innovation, 206 government support for energy innovation should
adhere to the following guidelines. First, funding for innovation must be
provided at a timeframe appropriate-for a period of ten years or more-for the
original stimulus funding, see Public Law 111-5, 123 Stat 140, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 1_congjpublic_laws&docid=f:publ005.
pdf.
203. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 27.
204. See WHAT ARE THE ENERGY INNOVATION HUBS?, http://energy.gov/articles/what-are-energy-
innovation-hubs (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
205. See Thomas Hart, Pirates Hijack One-Fifth of Daily U.S. Oil Imports in One Attack,
PERSONAL MONEY NETWORK BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011), http://personalmoneystore.com/moneyblog/
2011/02/09/pirates-hijack-u-s-oil!.
206. Hallmarks include the technology and infrastructure that brought forth the internet and the




enormous challenge of transforming the energy sector. Second, the agency
charged with the administration and allocation of these funds-ARPA-E-
should be endowed with substantial independence from Congress to ensure a
broad, bipartisan approach, free from earmarks or excessive scrutiny. Third,
following DARPA's example, the review process should be internal, lean, and
fast, guided by an entrepreneurial, risk-taking culture. Fourth, approval of
funding should be accompanied by a process for monitoring success, such as
through predetermined milestones and performance gates. Lastly, all
technologies with the long-term potential for large-scale deployment must be
considered to avoid path dependency problems.
The goal of any government support of energy innovation should be to
eventually charge the private sector with the commercialization of new
technology. Therefore, funding should be set aside for the demonstration stage
of emerging technologies. The energy sector is notorious for its long valley of
death between proof of concept and late-stage development. 207 Government
demonstration projects can create bridge markets to help cross this valley.
Today's maturing renewables technologies, such as wind and solar
photovoltaics, would hardly have progressed toward commercialization without
major government support at the demonstration stage.
Following the 1970s oil crisis, Congress passed the Solar Photovoltaic
Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1978.208 Other nations
enacted similar programs. For instance, Germany's success in the deployment
of wind turbines started with the government's comparatively modest 250-
megawatt (MW) Wind Program of 1989, designed to allow for demonstration
of then emerging wind turbine technology.209 In Denmark, deployment of
residential solar photovoltaic installations began with the SOL-300 Project,
aimed to deploy just 300 rooftop installations to provide education and training
in photovoltaic technology, system mounting, and testing. The program proved
a huge success, raising public awareness and interest in the new technology. 210
Similar demonstration projects in the United States can help today's emerging
renewables technologies-such as tidal energy and advanced biofuels-to
mature toward commercialization.
A sustained government commitment to support energy innovation
through the demonstration stage sends a strong signal to the private sector that
will incentivize industry efforts to innovate. Reform of the present system of
207. WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 13, at 31.
208. Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5581-5600 (1978).
209. See OLE LANGNISS, ENERGY FOUNDATION, CHINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY PROGRAM, THE
GERMAN 250-MW-WIND-PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.efchina.org/csepupfiles/report/
200762911200540.0925320001102.pdf/German 250MW%2OWind%2OProgOle%20Langniss.pdf (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011).
210. See EUROPEAN ENERGY COMM'N, THE SOL-300 PROJECT-A 300 ROOF-TOP PROJECT,
DENMARK, available at http://www.managenergy.net/download/nr57.pdf
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electricity rate regulation offers a similarly effective option to engage the
private sector, while placing a much smaller burden on the federal budget. As
discussed, the currently prevailing rate-of-return regulation is prone to the
Averch-Johnson effect, encouraging an inefficiently high ratio of capital versus
labor expenditures. 211 Energy innovation, especially in its earlier stages,
requires a vast amount of research, generating significant labor costs. In
consequence, rate-of-return regulation does not allow utilities to earn a return
on their R&D expenditures. As a result, it discourages electric utilities
companies from undertaking their own in-house innovative efforts to advance
the transition to renewables. To judge the innovative merits of rate-of-return
regulation against other regulatory concepts, such as revenue sharing, revenue-
caps, price-caps or yardstick approaches, is beyond the scope of this Article. 212
Yet the disincentivization of in-house innovation by the present rate-of-return
regime suggests that the rate-base calculation should be adjusted so as to
include and reward investment in innovation by electric utilities companies, for
capital and labor expenditures alike.
B. Policy Suggestions to Overcome Marketplace Barriers to Entry
In order to overcome the identified marketplace barriers to entry, a
comprehensive U.S. renewables policy should include the elimination of fossil
fuel subsidies, as suggested in Part IV.B.1, and sustained active policy support
for the deployment of renewables, as proposed in Part IV.B.2. To aid
renewables in their struggle to compete against incumbent fossil fuel
technologies, product differentiation should be improved, as discussed in Part
IV.B.3. In addition, priority grid access with a purchase obligation imposed on
the local utility, as outlined in Part IV.B.4, and exemption from the electricity
market's balancing responsibilities, discussed in Part IV.B.5, are necessary to
guarantee renewables access to the electricity market. In the absence of a clear
federal commitment to support renewables deployment, reform of the
regulatory framework is in order to grant the states more freedom in their
efforts to support renewables, as suggested in Part IV.B.6.
1. Elimination of Fossil Fuel Subsidies
If renewables are to assume a significant share in the electricity generation
market, that share will have to come from fossil fuel incumbents. These
incumbents, however, are deeply entrenched in the market, thanks to decades of
government subsidies. Only if Washington reduces-or better yet eliminates-
its support for fossil fuels can renewables compete successfully in the market.
211. See supra Part II.A.3.
212. For an instructive overview and comparison of the most common regulatory regimes in the
electricity market, see Training Module on Electricity Market Regulation - SESSION 3, LEONARDO
ENERGY, http://www.leonardo-energy.org/training-module-electricity-market-regulation-session-3 (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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In his 2011 State of the Union Address, President Obama considered doing
away with fossil fuel subsidies. 213 Such a measure would not only help level
the electricity market's playing field, but it would also free approximately $4
billion in annual government support for fossil fuels-money direly needed to
help fund innovation in renewable energy technologies. 214 In tandem with
emission pricing, even at a price set below the actual cost to the environment,
such an initiative could well fund the energy innovation necessary to facilitate a
timely transition to renewables.
In addition, the likely increase in electricity rates following the elimination
of fossil fuel subsidies will affect power consumption. As rates go up, the
incentives to invest in energy efficiency also increase. The 2008 surge in oil
prices represents an illustrative example of such a behavioral effect, generating
an unprecedented interest in fuel-efficient cars. In response to the shift in
consumer demand, General Motors, for instance, closed four truck and SUV
plants, dropped the gas guzzling Hummer from its model portfolio, and pushed
to release its plug-in hybrid model Volt. 215
At the same time, a multi-tiered, progressive rate structure should ensure
that electricity remains affordable to low-income households. Similar rate
structures have long been implemented for water to balance drought prevention
with satisfying basic household needs. 216 Whereas electricity rates historically
encouraged more rather than less consumption, 217 multi-tiered, progressive rate
structures have taken over to instead incentivize energy efficiency. 218
2. Active Policy Support for Renewables Deployment
In order to ramp up the deployment of renewables, a comprehensive U.S.
renewables policy must include strong and direct financial support. 219 As
discussed earlier, the introduction of an emission pricing regime that reflects
the full environmental cost of emissions is politically unlikely at present.220 A
timely elimination of all fossil fuel subsidies, too, seems doubtful. Already,
President Obama's proposal to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies has been met with
213. See Obama, supra note 12.
214. See Broder, supra note 184.
215. Chris Isidore, GM: Trucks Out, Cars In, CNN MONEY (June 3, 2008), available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/03/news/companies/gmannouncement/index.htm.
216. See, e.g., Water Resources and Conservation: Water Rates, CITY OF PETALUMA,
http://cityofpetaluma.net/wrcd/waterrates.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
217. See PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE
FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 2 (2010).
218. See, e.g., David R. Baker, PG&E Seeks to Change the Way It Sets Rates, SFGATE (Mar. 24,
2010), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/03/24/MN6QICKB4S.DTL
(describing the multi-tiered rate structure of Pacific Gas & Electric Company).
219. As one commentator put it: "Energy investment, especially renewable energy investment, is
expensive and moves slowly. Mild nudges are not likely to have any discernable effect." Joshua P.
Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REv. 1405, 1420-21 (2010).
220. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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fierce criticism from the fossil fuel lobby.221 Even if all these measures were
adopted instantaneously, few-if any-renewables technologies would be fully
cost competitive with fossil fuel incumbents that have the benefit of a well-
established production infrastructure.
Regardless of whether American support of renewables deployment
assumes the shape of a feed-in tariff, certificate trading, a tender scheme, or tax
credits, the policy learning experience of the United States and other nations
suggests certain key elements for successful policy design. First, deployment
support must be long-term if it is to send the strong market signal necessary for
sustained success. The boom and bust cycles of the U.S. wind rush in the 1980s
are a prime example of the harmful effects of short-term and intermittent
support for renewables. 222 More recently, when the production tax credits for
biomass, wind, and solar established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 expired
in 1999, environmental advocates worked hard to ensure that Washington
would renew these credits on an annual basis through 2001. When Congress
failed to agree on another such renewal before the end of 2001, investment in
wind turbines dropped precipitously. Developers installed a little over 400 MW
of new capacity in 2002, compared to 1,600 MW of capacity installed in
2001.223 Sadly, American support for renewables continues to lack the
necessary long-term commitment. Thus, it was not until December 2010 that
Congress extended the Section 1603 program for deployment support of
renewables into 2011, but not beyond.224 In contrast, other nations have set up
support programs featuring initial terms of eligibility of five years or more,
with support guaranteed over up to twenty years. 225 The longevity and stability
of these programs have fostered sustained growth in deployment rates and
strong domestic renewables industries, as the example of Denmark's wind
industry illustrates. 226
Second, support for renewables must be technology-specific. In order to
avoid the risk of replacing one path dependency with another, policy support
must account for different levels of maturity, efficiency, and production cost of
the various strands of renewable energy technology. To illustrate the wide
spread, it should be noted that some biomass facilities already produce
electricity for under $0.03 per kilowatt hour (kWh), while certain solar
221. See Broder, supra note 184.
222. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
223. MENDONCA ETAL., supra note 75, at 135.
224. See Recovery Act, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
recovery/Pages/1603.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). For details on the Section 1603 program
originally contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (PL 111-5), see id.
225. See SUBSIDIES FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?
mode-re&id=2492&action=detail (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (Denmark's 2004 Subsidies for
Renewable Energy Generation Act); 2009 AMENDMENT OF GERMANY'S RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
ACT, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re&id=4054&action=detail (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
226. See Lipp, supra note 14, at 5486, 5492.
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photovoltaic facilities still struggle to reduce production costs to under $0.50
per kWh. 227
Third, deployment support for renewables must be designed to allow a fair
rate of return, while avoiding windfall benefits. Thus, support levels must be
continuously monitored and adjusted to account for the respective technology's
learning curve. To this end, periodic progress reports are crucial, especially in
the early stages of a new price-based support regime. As policy makers gain
more experience, progress report intervals may lengthen. In the interim,
adjustments to the level of support may be made by means of an annual tariff
degression based on the year of grid connection. As the slope of the learning
curve varies depending on a technology's maturity, such degression rates
should be technology-specific. For instance, Germany's Renewable Energies
Act of 2004 established a 1 percent degression for small hydroelectric, 2
percent for wind, and 5 percent for solar.228 At the other end of the spectrum,
Sweden's certificate trading regime is criticized for generating windfall profits
by offering revenues that far exceed actual costs and reasonable rates of
return.229
Finally, in the absence of a strong, long-term federal commitment to
deployment support, Congress should clear the way for states to adopt and
implement their own policies to promote renewables deployment. Already,
some thirty states have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards, which call for
an increase of the share of renewables in their respective energy mix. 230 But
state-level efforts are limited in their discretion due to issues of federal
preemption resulting from the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 231
(PURPA) and the 1935 Federal Power Act 232. In particular, a feed-in tariff
similar to those that have proven to be such successful drivers of renewables
deployment in Europe may not pass FERC scrutiny. Until recently, FERC
would likely declare that PURPA preempts a state feed-in tariff that mandated
utility companies to pay subsidized rates for electricity from qualifying
facilities. One of PURPA's key mandates is that the purchase obligations
imposed on utilities may not "provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental
227. For details, see CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDtN, supra note 8, at 15. Other technologies,
such as tidal, are not yet mature enough to allow for a reliable determination of their eventual cost of
production, if and when entering the market.
228. See Paul Gipe, Depression of Renewable Tariffs, WIND-WORKS (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/DegressionofRenewableTariffs.html.
229. Bergek & Jacobsson, supra note 173, at 1260.
230. As of December 2011, twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
implemented RPS policies, eight more states have adopted non-binding goals for the deployment of
renewables. See Quantitative RPS Data Project, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2011).
231. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2006); Priv. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). For a detailed
discussion of PURPA and its relevance to energy entrepreneurs pioneering in renewables and
cogeneration, see Robert N. Danziger, Renewable Energy Resources and Cogeneration: Community
Systems and Grid Interaction as a Public Utility Enterprise, 2 WHITTIER L. REv. 81, 94 (1979).
232. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2006); Federal Powers Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1920).
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cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy." 233 Traditionally,
FERC has determined such avoided cost by considering all energy sources and
pointing to the lowest-cost electricity generation option among them-usually
coal or natural gas. 234 As a result, FERC would find that PURPA preempts
state legislation requiring utilities to purchase electricity from certain types of
generators, including renewables plants, insofar as the legislation mandated
utilities to pay rates above the cost of the overall lowest-cost generation
alternative among all fuel sources and generation technologies. 235
More than thirty years after the adoption of PURPA, FERC's October
2010 California Public Utilities Commission decision acknowledges for the
first time the possibility of a different point of reference to determine avoided
cost.236 Thus,
if a state required a utility to purchase 10 percent of its energy needs from
renewable sources, then a natural gas-fired unit, for example, would not be
a source "able to sell" to that utility for the specified renewable resources
segment of the utility's energy needs, and thus would not be relevant to
determining avoided costs for that segment of the utility's energy needs. 237
According to FERC's clarification, the path now seems clear for state
feed-in tariffs under PURPA to establish higher rates for electricity from
renewables so long as (i) there is a state mandate, such as an RPS calling for
the utilities' procurement of a certain percentage of electricity from renewables,
and (ii) the established rate does not exceed the avoided cost for the
generation/procurement of electricity from renewables.
While FERC's California Public Utilities Commission clarification marks
an important step toward greater latitude for state-level deployment policies,
substantial legal uncertainty remains. For instance, it is not entirely clear
whether FERC's reasoning requires state feed-in tariffs to consider the lowest-
cost renewable electricity options, or if a multi-tiered tariff structure that further
distinguishes among various renewable energy technologies would pass the
commission's scrutiny. Another, far greater concern for state efforts to promote
renewables is that the revised rate-setting option based on renewables' avoided
cost is only available under PURPA. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended
PURPA, granting FERC authority to exempt an electric utility from its PURPA
obligations vis-A-vis certain qualifying facilities if these facilities have
233. See 16 U.S.C. 824a-3 (2006).
234. See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison, 71 F.E.R.C. 161,269, 62,080 (1995) ("[T]he California Commission
must include all sources in determining avoided cost rates."). For an overview of alternative state
subsidy options, see SCOTT HEMPLING ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORIES,
RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICES IN STATE-LEVEL FEED-fN TARIFFS: FEDERAL LAW CONSTRAINTS AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy lOosti/47408.pdf
235. See, e.g., Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 61,035, 61,153 (1995); S. Cal. Edison, 71
F.E.R.C. 161,269, 62,075 (1995).




undiscriminatory access to a qualified sales platform for their electricity. 238
Once FERC grants the exemption, states are ousted of their jurisdiction to
impose a purchase obligation-at any price-on electric utilities. The then
applicable 1935 Federal Power Act vests the authority to set wholesale rates,
such as those mandated by a state feed-in tariff, exclusively with FERC. 239
Hence, without further regulatory clarification or reform, PURPA leakage
under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 may turn the California Public Utilities
Commission decision into a Pyrrhic victory for state-level deployment policies.
3. Product Differentiation Through Green Marketing
The higher the level of product differentiation between electricity from
fossil fuels and from renewable sources of energy, the greater the potential for
renewables to compete with fossil fuels. Emission pricing regimes are easily
the best way to enhance product differentiation, but their widespread adoption
appears doubtful at least in the near future. 240 In the absence of such a regime,
green marketing offers an alternative option to raise consumer sensitivity and
appreciation for sustainable power from renewables. Since 1992, the EPA's
Energy Star program has promoted energy-efficient products through voluntary
labeling, saving electricity consumers some $18 billion in 2010 alone. 241 I
suggest the introduction of a Renewable Star program that allows electricity
consumers to boast their commitment to electricity from renewable sources of
energy.
I envision a program similar to the U.S. Green Building Council's
certification for Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED). 242
LEED allows buildings or communities to receive-and advertise-their
certification for achievements regarding energy savings, water efficiency,
carbon dioxide emissions reductions, improved indoor environmental quality,
and stewardship of resources and sensitivity to their impacts. Among other
criteria for certification, LEED rewards onsite production and use of electricity
from renewables. Certification, however, requires substantial investment of
both time and money to meet the program's standards. 243 While interesting for
large-scale construction, and to a lesser extent for renovation, LEED
238. The undiscriminatory access requirement can be met through an independently administered
wholesale market or regional transmission interconnection. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1)(A)-(B)
(2006).
239. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006).
240. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.
241. See History of Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.
abhistory (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
242. For more information on LEED, see What LEED Is, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD= 1988 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
243. For an overview, see the comprehensive application guidance materials, Guidance for
Multiple Buildings and On-Campus Projects, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=2326 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
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certification offers little appeal to existing buildings and businesses or small-
scale construction.
In contrast to LEED's holistic concept, Renewable Star would follow a
simplistic approach, focusing exclusively on the procurement of electricity
from renewables. Businesses or residences that contract with their local utilities
to buy electricity from renewables would receive Renewable Star certification
to be displayed in their shop windows, on their websites, etc. Many businesses
across the nation already advertise similar commitments to sustainability, such
as restaurants emphasizing the use of organic food, or caf6s selling fair trade
coffee and tea. Renewable Star certification would grant its participants public
recognition in return for their willingness to pay extra for electricity from
renewables. Moreover, it would raise awareness that more and more utility
companies in the United States offer to supply their customers with electricity
generated exclusively from renewables. Already, some 860 utility companies in
forty states offer such green pricing programs to their customers. 244
O Statam wfh Qwn PGlckg Pagrs
imilcate Stumber of UtitestCopanies Offering
Green Pomer Products
FIGURE 5. AVAILABILITY OF GREEN PRICING PROGRAMS
IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2008 245
More than half of all U.S. electricity consumers have the option to buy
green power directly from their local retailer. 246 In 2009, the voluntary green
power market actually sold more electricity from renewables (30 million
244. LORI BIRD & JENNY SUMNER, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORIES, GREEN POWER
MARKETING IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT 1 (2010).
245. MENDONCA ETAL., supra note 75, at 161.
246. BIRD & SUMNER, supra note 244, at 1.
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megawatt hours) than state RPS policies required utilities to procure (29.5
million megawatt hours). 247 Participants in green pricing programs include
large energy consumers such as the City of San Diego, the University of
Pennsylvania, Johnson & Johnson, and Starbucks. 248 Yet, overall only 552,200
electricity consumers participated in the regulated electricity markets' green
pricing programs. 249 This relatively small client base illustrates the huge
potential for further growth of green pricing, especially among businesses and
other nonresidential electricity customers, who account for only 45 percent of
the green pricing market's current customer base. 250 A certification program
like Renewable Star can exploit the presently untapped potential of businesses
to increase demand for electricity from renewables.
4. Subsidized Priority Grid Access
Successful entry of renewables into the power generation market requires
access to the power grid. In a market traditionally characterized by bundling of
generation, transmission, and distribution, grid operators are likely to prioritize
their own generation over that of incoming renewables plants. PURPA requires
local utility companies to purchase all power generated by qualifying facilities,
including those who produce electricity from renewable sources of energy. 251
In practice, this purchase obligation needs to be backed by guaranteed grid
access for such facilities. 252 Delays in grid connection can easily increase the
lead-time of renewables plants and drive up the risk and cost of investment. 253
Therefore, newly constructed renewable energy plants should be granted
priority grid access. Most importantly, grid connection of incoming renewables
facilities should not be subject to transmission capacity. 254 In other words,
requests for grid connection by renewables plants and transmission of their
electricity should not be denied on the basis of grid congestion. If anything,
insufficient capacity should limit the transmission of electricity from fossil
fuels, emphasizing the commitment to renewable energy. Grid reinforcement
and expansion deserve to become a national priority, sponsored through public
247. Green pricing programs and state RPS policies generally ensure the clear separation between
both markets so as to avoid double counting. See id at 9.
248. MENDONCA ET AL., supra note 75, at 162.
249. These programs represent 60 percent of all green pricing programs. BIRD & SUMNER, supra
note 244, at 13.
250. Id. at 17.
251. See HEMPLING ET AL., supra note 234, at 5.
252. For the limited regulatory scope and practical success of FERC's attempt to establish non-
discriminatory grid access for incoming generators through Rules No. 2003, 2006, see the discussion in
note 94.
253. See Litthi & Priissler, supra note 94, at 4878.
254. The 2006 feed-in tariff scheme adopted by the Canadian province Ontario allows for the




funding as well as the regulatory approval by FERC to recuperate related costs
through higher electricity rates.
The cost of grid reinforcement raises the question of who is to bear the
cost of renewables' grid connection. The distribution of these costs may
determine the profitability of renewables plants and, hence, the probability of
their large-scale deployment. Depending on the renewable energy technology,
the cost of grid connection can account for more than a quarter of the total
project investment. 255 Under these circumstances, a "deep" cost allocation-
placing the burden of actual grid connection and reinforcement on the new
plant-would likely discourage investment in renewables plants. 256
Photovoltaic 4.8
Biomass CHP 2.9 1 3.5
Wind Offshore 9 26.4
Wind Onshore 3.6 13.6
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FIGURE 6. GRID CONNECTION COST AS A FRACTION (PERCENT) OF
TOTAL INVESTMENT COST2 57
In order to facilitate the timely transition from fossil fuels to renewables,
allocation of grid connection costs should follow a "shallow," in some cases
even a "super-shallow," approach. 258 In general, the construction cost for the
transmission lines that connect the new plant to the existing grid, following the
"shallow" cost allocation model, will be an acceptable burden to renewables
producers, including biomass and most residential solar photovoltaics facilities.
In some cases, such as offshore wind farms, a "super-shallow" approach is
preferable so as to ensure that siting decisions are based primarily. on the
availability of the respective energy source-wind. Similarly, large-scale
255. Id.
256. For the distinction between "deep," "shallow," and "super-shallow" cost allocation
methodologies, see discussion, supra Part I.B.3.
257. MENDONCA ET AL., supra note 75, at 31.
258. See supra Part II.B.3.
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concentrated solar thermal projects, such as those in the Mojave Desert, 259
should benefit from "super-shallow" cost allocation to guarantee resource-
efficient siting. In all of these cases, FERC and other regulatory entities must
ensure that the connection costs can be distributed evenly across all electricity
consumers, for example, through system charges passed on by network
operators and utilities. Finally, the permit process must include safeguards
against abusive siting that would generate higher connection costs than
necessary for optimal conditions, such as wind speed or insolation.260
5. Exemption from Balancing Responsibilities
Renewable energy technologies with intermittent output, such as wind and
solar, face severe challenges when competing in the electricity market's day-
ahead trade. 261 Beyond a four-hour window, uncertainty over wind speed and
insolation does not allow for reliable forecasting of their power output. Yet
renewables plant operators often see themselves forced to make such forecasts
so as to trade in the day-ahead markets. Prone to error, these forecasts may
require ancillary services to smooth over the imbalance resultant from the
renewables plant's under- or overperformance.
For the time being, I suggest exempting all intermittent renewables from
the electricity market's forecast obligations and balancing responsibilities
because these obligations discourage investment in intermittent renewables. In
the absence of a strong emission pricing regime, solar and wind are already
struggling to become cost-competitive with fossil fuel incumbents, even
without the burden of forecast and balancing responsibilities. So long as fossil
fuels continue to be cross-subsidized through their ability to externalize their
environmental production costs, renewables deserve to be cross-subsidized by
passing their balancing costs on to all electricity consumers through system
charges. After all, the environmental benefits of renewables deployment in the
form of climate change mitigation through reduced greenhouse gas emissions
also accrue to all electricity consumers. Furthermore, the social cost of
intermittent renewables' grid integration is much lower than generally assumed.
According to the International Energy Agency, below a market penetration
of 5 percent, the fluctuations in wind energy output fail to even register in the
grid's continuous load changes, such as when demand shifts. 262 A series of
U.S. and international studies have examined various scenarios with wind
259. See, e.g., Matthew Daly, Mojave Solar Plan: Feds Approve World's Largest Solar Power
Plant in Mojave Desert, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2010/10/25/mojave-solar-plant-feds-a_n_773658.html.
260. For further adjustments to the permit process, see discussion infra Part IV.D.
261. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
262. TIMUR GOL & TILL STENZEL, VARIABILITY OF WIND POWER AND OTHER RENEWABLES,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY 23 (2005).
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market penetrations between 10 percent and 29 percent. 263 Their findings
suggest that, up to a wind penetration of 20 percent, the cost of balancing wind
energy's intermittency will remain under $0.005 per kWh264-approximately 4
percent of average retail rates for residential customers.265 For most of the
United States, wind generation has yet to reach these levels of penetration.266
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that ancillary balancing services are likely to
be carried out by so-called peaker plants-usually older plants that can be
dispatched at relatively short notice but have such high operational costs that
they are not profitable other than at peak demand, when wholesale prices are
highest. 267 Without the need for ancillary balancing services to smooth out the
intermittency of renewables, these peakers will likely be among the first plants
to be decommissioned as renewables bring new capacity online and, hence,
eliminate the need for these older, less efficient plants to ensure sufficient
capacity to meet peak demand. Thus, the intermittency of wind and solar power
offers the chance to find new use for these plants in the short term, and to
displace them more gradually in the longer term.268
Going forward, the issue of renewables' intermittency should not be
addressed only at the regulatory level but also from a technical point of view.
For instance, advances in energy storage technology can help with balancing
intermittency. The most common storage technologies are electrochemical
(batteries, fuel cells), electromagnetic (supercapacitors), and mechanical
(compressed air, flywheels, pumped hydro).269 At present, most of these
technologies are too expensive to economically store the energy required for
balancing. Pumped hydro, however, has considerable market potential. In fact,
Denmark already utilizes pumped hydro to cope with the intermittency of its
substantial wind power capacity. 270 The Danes sell almost all of their wind
power to their European neighbors, some of whom have hydroelectric facilities
they can turn down to balance their wind energy imports. In times of low wind
and high demand, the saved hydropower is sold back to Denmark. The Danish
example only works because of the country's large-capacity power connections
263. For a synthesis, see LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORIES,
RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICE-STABILITY BENEFITS IN UTILITY GREEN POWER PROGRAMS, TECHNICAL
REPORT 9 (2008).
264. Id.
265. The retail rate is based on the U.S. average according to Energy Information Administration
data for July 2011. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY FLASH ESTIMATES OF ELECTRIC POWER DATA
(July 2011), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/september20 11/september2011 .pdf.
266. BIRD ET AL., supra note 263, at 9.
267. FOX-PENNER, supra note 217, at 96.
268. Already, the electricity market is inundated with a substantial amount of excess generation
capacity, as illustrated by the struggles of current nuclear plant proposals to lock in long-term power
contracts. See Matthew L. Wald, US. Pushes, but Reactors Are Lagging, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at
BI, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/business/energy-environment/Olnuke.html.
269. See JAY MARIYAPPAN ET AL., COST AND TECHNICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ELECTRICITY
STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES, REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMM'N 11 (2004).
270. MACKAY, supra note 23, at 197.
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to neighboring Norway (1 gigawatt (GW)), Sweden (0.6 GW), and Germany
(1.2 GW), all of whom have substantial hydroelectric with which they
compensate for intermittency. 271 These network effects need not be limited to
the exchange of wind for hydroelectric energy. Rather, a large enough grid with
high-capacity interconnections could provide balancing between or even within
individual strands of renewable energies. Strong sunlight in California or wind
in Texas could, for instance, balance low wind speeds in Wyoming. Such
interconnection, however, requires substantial investment in the transmission
infrastructure. Another storage option lies in the growth of plug-in (hybrid)
vehicles whose batteries could store excess energy. Dynamic electricity rate
structues could incentivize the owners of plug-in vehicles to charge their cars
during hours of peak renewables output. To implement such a rate structure,
however, would require further investment to establish a smart(er) grid, which
is not the subject of this Article.
C. Policy Suggestions to Overcome Non-Marketplace Barriers to Entry
A comprehensive U.S. renewables policy that aims to overcome the
identified non-marketplace barriers to entry should first and foremost
streamline the permit process for renewable energy plants, as proposed in Part
IV.C.1. In order to facilitate efficient siting, spatial planning regimes should be
adjusted to renewables' special needs and potential, as suggested in Part
IV.C.2. Finally, educational campaigns and local involvement can help
overcome the growing "not-in-my-backyard" attitude and improve local
acceptance of renewables projects, as discussed in Part IV.C.3.
1. Streamlining of Permit Process
The permit process for electricity generation facilities that rely on
renewable sources of energy must be streamlined to increase deployment. The
present web of parallel proceedings and duplicative agency involvement
increase lead times and run up the investment cost of renewables facilities.
Other energy sources can guide the way to a streamlined renewables permit
process. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been working for
more than fifteen years to streamline reactor licensing in the United States
resulting in reduced construction time and permit-related investor risk.272
Reactor licensing raises a whole plethora of complex technological,
environmental, and security questions. In comparison, renewables projects,
such as wind turbines or solar photovoltaic installations, may be less complex.
From a financial perspective, however, the delay and cost resulting from
271. Id
272. For more information on the NRC's regulatory activity, see How We Regulate, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM., http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). In
fact, the NRC is presently building a new 14-story office tower to accommodate 1,500 employees
charged with the review and processing of reactor projects. Wald, supra note 268, at B I.
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lengthy permit procedures hit renewables plant projects much harder relative to
their significantly smaller output capacity. 273 But no agency or institution
comparable to the NRC has so far been established to handle applications for
plants relying on renewable sources of energy. This regulatory lag is all the
more unfortunate as renewables' smaller output capacity requires the filing of
far more individual permit applications than for large-scale conventional power
plants. Simply put, there is considerably more red tape to be cut through for a
megawatt of new capacity from renewable electricity than for the same
capacity from fossil fuels. I therefore suggest the establishment of one federal
agency charged with processing permit applications for the construction of
renewable energy power plants, at least for medium to large-scale plants. With
the proper guidance, 274 state and local agencies can process permit applications
for residential and other small-scale facilities. Spain's Renewable Energy Plan
2005-2010, for instance, established a single office charged with the oversight
of all renewables and cogeneration operations. 275 If needed, one agency could
be established for each different technology so as to build and pool expertise. In
the short term, cooperation among the different agencies should be improved
following the example of Sweden's Advisory Council for the Promotion of
Wind. 276 Established in 2005, the council provides for the collaboration of
state secretaries from various ministries including Agriculture, Defense,
Education, Finance, and Sustainable Development to resolve conflicts of
interest in the construction of wind power plants.
In addition to these efforts, permit procedures should be optimized so as to
better reflect the special needs and potential of renewables. For instance, Spain
passed Royal Decree 1028/2007 specifically to establish the administrative
procedures for processing permit applications regarding off-shore wind
turbines. 277 Similar regimes in the United States could not only accelerate the
permit process but also ensure that all relevant factors are taken into
consideration. 278 As such, minimum standards for insolation or wind forces
should be established to mandate efficient siting. Such permit requirements are
273. See discussion supra Part II.C.I.
274. Such guidance could, for example, assume the form of model zoning. See discussion infra Part
IV.C.2.
275. See Plan de Energias Renovables 2005-2010, INSTITUTO PARA LA DIVERSIFICACION Y
AHORRO DE ENERGIA, http://www.idae.es/index.php/mod.documentos/mem.descarga?file=/
documentos PER 2005-2010_8_de gosto-2005_Completo.(modificacionpag_63) Copia_2_301254a0.
pdf at p. 9 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
276. See Advisory Council for the Promotion of Wind Power, WEO DATABASE,
http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=weo&action=detail&id=2447 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
277. See Royal Decree 1028/2007 (B.O.E. 2007, 183) (Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/
aeboe/consultas/basesdatos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=2007/14657.
278. The creation of the Renewable Energy Action Team, an inter-agency task force, formed by the
California Energy Commission and the Department of Fish and Game, to streamline the application
process for renewable energy development is a promising step in the right direction. See Implementing




all the more important where the suggested super-shallow connection approach
is adopted to prevent inefficient or abusive siting. Similarly, Sweden's 1999
Environmental Code established the best technology principle, requiring
renewables operators to use the best available technology. 279
2. Reform of Zoning Regulation
Spatial planning should not bar but rather guide and encourage the
widespread deployment of renewables. Today, many zoning regimes across the
United States ignore or even prohibit the installation of renewables facilities in
certain areas. 280 In order to raise awareness among local planners and provide
guidance, I suggest the development of a model zoning regime for renewables
at the federal level. Other nations have long implemented policies to incentivize
local planners' consideration of renewables. Germany, for instance, encourages
local planners to establish so-called wind energy concentration zones. 281 These
zones not only ensure efficient siting, they also help minimize issues related to
the aesthetic impact of wind turbines in scenic areas. Closer to home, the State
of Michigan has issued guidelines for the inclusion of wind energy systems in
local zoning. 282 The sample ordinances offer guidelines for local governments
that wish to amend their zoning ordinance to address wind energy systems.
While there is plenty of planning expertise out there, it is not always readily
available to local planners. It is time a federally drafted model ordinance help
local planners to include all relevant sources of renewable energy in their
zoning considerations. 283 Canada's RETScreen International Clean Energy
Decision Support Center could serve as the model for a U.S. program.
Established in 1996, the RETScreen program seeks to build the capacity of
planners, decision makers and industry to implement renewable energy and
energy efficiency projects. 284
279. See Environmental Legislation, GOv'T OFFICES OF SWEDEN, http://www.sweden.gov.
se/sb/d/3704 (last updated June 2, 2009).
280. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 119, at 9-10.
281. While often challenged by wind developers, wind energy concentration zones continue to
encourage and guide wind turbine deployment in Germany. See Matthias Lang, BverwG Upholds Wind
Energy Concentration Zone Restrictions, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (May 27, 2010), http://www.
germanenergyblog.de/?p=2878.
282. See, e.g., MICHIGAN'S ON-SHORE WIND ZONING GUIDELINES, http://michigan.gov/documents/
mdcd/On-ShoreWind_9-28-11_365181 7.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). For a more detailed
discussion of this and other state model zoning regimes, see ASS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES &
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WIND POWER SITING, INCENTIVES, AND WILDLIFE GUIDELINES IN THE
UNITED STATES (October 2007), http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/AFWA%
20Wind%2OPower/o2OFinal%20Report.pdf.
283. As local planning does not always align with global concerns over climate change, the success
of the proposed model ordinance will depend on accompanying measures, such as educational
campaigns and local involvement. See infra Part IV.D.3-4.
284. See Centre Overview, NATURAL RES. CANADA, http://www.retscreen.net/ang/




Spatial planning is but one example of the need to bring awareness and
knowledge of climate change and its mitigation through renewables to
American communities. The more people know of the risks, benefits, and
potential advantages of renewables, the easier their promotion and large-scale
deployment becomes. Many other nations have already embraced the
promotional value of educational campaigns. Under Sweden's 2001
Sustainable Municipality Program, for instance, the Swedish Energy Agency
assists municipalities in the introduction of renewables through environmental
scanning to assess local renewable energy potential, basic data, and method
support. 285 India's Central Financial Assistance for Biogas Plants offers
subsidies for different types of related training courses. 286 Similarly, Canada's
1999 Climate Change Fund included a public education and outreach
component designed to inform Canadians of the challenges of climate change
and renewables' potential for mitigation. 287 The U.S. State Energy Program
(SEP) is a step in this direction. Established in 1996, the SEP provides financial
assistance to states to design and implement programs that benefit renewables
and energy efficiency through communication and outreach activities,
technology deployment, and accessing new partnerships and resources. 288
Following a budget allocation of $35 million in 2006, raised incrementally to
$50 million by 2009, the SEP received a substantial boost from a $3.1,billion
appropriation through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.289
The vast majority of these funds, however, goes toward state-level deployment
support initiatives. A closer look at the SEP-funded projects illustrates that the
program's education and outreach component is continuously neglected by the
states.290 The Department of Energy would be well advised to impose a stricter
requirement under the SEP to use a minimum portion of allocated funds for
educational campaigns that further popular understanding and approval of
renewables.
285. See Sustainable Municipalities in Sweden, NORDIC ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.nordicenergysolutions.org/inspirational/sustainable-municipalities-in-sweden (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011); The Sustainable Municipality, SWEDISH ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.
energimyndigheten.se/en/Energy-efficiency/The-Sustainable-Municipality/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
286. See CENT. FIN. ASSISTANCE (CFA) FOR BIOGAS PLANTS, http://www.iea.org/
textbase/pm/?mode=cc&id=2196&action=detail (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
287. See CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION FUND, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re&id=127&
action=detail (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
288. See Recovery Act and the State Energy Program, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://wwwl.
eere.energy.gov/wip/recoveryact-sep.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
289. For an overview of the distribution of these funds among the states, see Weatherization &
Intergovernmental Program: Recovery Act Funding to the States, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,





Local constituents' involvement is just as important as educational
outreach in gaining widespread approval of renewables projects. The
pioneering nations in renewables have long relied on programs that allow for
the active participation of citizens in new power plants that rely on renewable
sources of energy. The most famous example is Denmark's wind co-operative
model. Fostered by the 1997 establishment of special incentives for wind
energy co-operatives, 291 local participation in Danish wind energy projects has
soared. By 2001, more than 100,000 families in Denmark were part of wind co-
operatives that accounted for 86 percent of the country's wind turbines.292 By
2009, there were more than 100 wind turbine co-operatives of varying sizes in
Denmark with participation of more than 200,000 Danish families. 293
Germany, too, has relied heavily on local participation in its successful drive
for wind turbine deployment. In 2007, for instance, wind turbines in the
German province of North Frisia, owned by some 6,000 farmers and local
investors generated 1.3 TWh of electricity-more than California's San
Gorgonio pass or Altamont pass. 294 In order to facilitate high levels of local
participation, buy-ins are deliberately kept relatively affordable, e.g., at
$4,000.295 Hundreds of thousands of Germans have become shareholders in so-
called citizens' wind farms across the country. 296
In contrast, the present U.S. regulatory landscape, in its reliance on tax
credits, does not incentivize broad public participation in renewables projects.
Tax credits such as those offered under Section 1603297 require positive cash
flow or other tax equity as tax liabilities to offset. Thus, they tend to favor large
corporate investors instead of local citizen participation. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act's introduction of the Section 1603 grant in lieu
of tax credits marked an important step toward a broader base of renewable
291. See WIND ENERGY CO-OPERATIVE TAX INCENTIVE, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/
?mode=re&id=77&action=detail (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
292. See H. C. SOERENSEN ET AL., INT'L SOC'Y OF OFFSHORE AND POLAR ENGINEERS,
MIDDELGRUNDEN 40 MW OFFSHORE WIND FARM, A PRESTUDY FOR THE DANISH OFFSHORE 750 MW
WIND PROGRAM (2000), available at http://www.middelgrunden.dk/middelgrunden/sites/
default/files/public/file/Middelgrunden%2040%20MW%20offshore%20wind%20farm%20prestudy.pdf
293. See Nicolaj Stenkjaer, Wind Turbine Co-ops in Denmark, NORDIC FOLKECENTER FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY (Dec. 2008), http://www.folkecenter.net/gb/rd/wind-energy/48007/
windturbinecoopsdk/; Stefan Gsanger, Community Power Empowers, DISCOVERY (May 26, 2009, 3:23
PM), http://news.discovery.com/tech/community-wind-power-opinion.html.
294. See Paul Gipe, North German State to Double Wind Energy on Land, AM. SOLAR ENERGY
SOC'Y (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.ases.org/index.php?option=com myblog&show=North-German-
State-to-Double-Wind-Energy-on-Land.html&Itemid=27.
295. See Bj6rn Dosdall, Citizens' Wind Farms in Germany-As Seen By a Project Developer,
WINDWARTS, July 1, 2010 http://www.wind-eole.com/fileadmin/userupload/Downloads/Konferenzen/
Finanzierung/Dosdall englischx.pdf.
296. See Gstinger, supra note 293.
297. See discussion, supra Part IV.B.2.
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energy investors. 298 The grant allowed project developers eligible for Section
1603 tax credits to opt instead for an equivalent grant from the Treasury
Department. Following the 2008-09 economic downturn, the grant option was
adopted primarily to remedy the precipitous drop in tax equity among
renewable energy investors.299 Regrettably, the grant was not extended beyond
2011 and federal renewables support has reverted back to its historic reliance
on tax incentives alone.3o In order to facilitate the greatest possible
penetration, however, a comprehensive U.S. renewables policy should
encourage participation by a broad, ideally local base of investors. For cash-
flow reasons, it is advisable to continue to complement the existing tax credit
regimes with a more direct support scheme, such as cash grants or a feed-in
tariff.
CONCLUSION
The timely transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources to
decarbonize the electricity sector is one of the key ingredients of a successful
strategy for climate change mitigation. At present, however, the rise of
renewables to power is hindered by numerous market failures and peculiarities
that act as impediments to innovation and barriers to entry. The timely shift to a
low-carbon, renewables-based electricity sector requires a comprehensive U.S.
renewables policy to address each and every one of the existing obstacles.
Many of the policy recommendations in this Article aim at non-economic
barriers, which can be overcome through regulatory intervention. Once these
barriers have been removed, policy support for renewables can focus on the
remaining economic barriers and, hence, becomes considerably less costly.
Nonetheless, the necessary funding for renewables innovation and deployment
support imposes a heavy burden on the federal budget. To bear this burden
now, however, is the only way to avoid paying more later. Moreover, today's
government investments will pay off in the long run, once the required
transformation of the energy sector is catalyzed such that the private sector can
take over.
The institutional and regulatory reforms this Article proposes to
successfully mitigate climate change are so far-reaching that we need a
renewables revolution in the true sense of the word. 301 The current trend
298. For an overview of the Section 1603 grant and its promotional success, see Recovery Act:
1603 Program: Payments for Specified Energy Property in Lieu of Tax Credits, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/603.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 2011,
10:45 AM).
299. Between 2007 and 2009, available tax equity dropped from $6.1 billion to $1.2 billion. See
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, REASSESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES: ISSUE BRIEF 10 (2011).
300. See Gloria Gonzalez, Expiration of Cash Grant to Affect Biomass & Wind More Than Solar,
OIL PRICE, http://oilprice.com/Altemative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/Expiration-of-Cash-Grant-to-
Affect-Biomass-Wind-More-than-Solar.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2012, 10:56 PM) (pointing out that the
expiration of the grant program will hit small-scale projects particularly hard).
301. The term revolution is derived from the Latin word revolutio, meaning "a turn around."
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toward global warming can only be turned around if the economic and legal,
the engineering and scientific communities, as well as educators and marketers
join forces and coordinate their efforts. Following in the tradition of the
Industrial Revolution, the Renewables Revolution will have to permeate and
engage virtually all sectors of society.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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